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 i 
Abstract 
 
Several less industrialized countries lack prioritization in terms of safety and security in 
operations. This can, in the worst-case scenario, result in major accidents or disasters. 
Technology transfer between countries is seen as an opportunity to construct more robust 
systems. However, technology transfer is a complex task, and it is not possible to transfer the 
whole “technology package”. 
 
This study is based on the idea that transfer of technologies from industrialized countries can 
be used as a tool to create robust risk governance systems in developing countries. Norway has 
over forty years of experience in the petroleum industry, with well-functioning systems and an 
emphasis on safety. The Norwegian Government has initiated a program aiming to share this 
experience with developing countries. Uganda is used as case for this study, as they are one of 
the receivers of the program, and soon starting petroleum production. The research problem is 
“What promote/hamper the transfer of risk governance systems from the Norwegian petroleum 
sector to Uganda?”  
 
Technology transfer is presented through the iceberg model, illustrating the difficulties with 
transferring technology due to actors’ understandings and deeply integrated underlying 
conditions. Following, the risk governance system in its social construction is portrayed. These 
theories make the basis for the interpretation of the collected data. 
 
The data is gathered based on a qualitative method. The main data is collected through 
interviews with key actors involved in the cooperation and actors in the Ugandan petroleum 
industry. A five-week fieldwork was conducted in Uganda, including three days of observation 
in the oil fields. Literature study, social media and informal talks were conducted to gain a more 
in-depth understanding. 
 
In order to identify the parameters hampering or promoting the transfer, the data is analyzed 
through three research questions. These questions emphasize the actors focus areas within 
transfer of risk governance systems from Norway to Uganda. Furthermore, a study on the 
impact the present capacity can have on implementation of new technology, and in what way 
trust is present in the Ugandan risk governance system. 
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Through this study, four central parameters are found to promote and/or hamper the transfer of 
risk governance systems. The findings are not divided into “hamper” and “promotes” as the 
outcomes are dependent on the conditions, and could be both hampering and promoting the 
transfer.   
 
The promoting and/or hampering parameters found are “interplay” and “characteristics” 
among the involved actors in the transfer process, “time” and “preconditions” in the system. 
The interplay among involved actors highlights the importance of understanding the different 
actors involved, their background and local context. It is important with inclusion and 
involvement between and within all levels. Characteristics of the actors involved are reflected 
through motivation, willingness and knowledge and will affect the transfer process. Time 
prioritized to increase capacity in the system promotes the transfer process, if prioritized and 
used correctly, in accordance to the “receivers” local context. The preconditions present in the 
receiving country will shape how the elements need to be contextualized to their local context. 
The preconditions can challenge the capacity if there is a lack of know-why understanding of 
these preconditions and the transferred elements.  
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1. Introduction 
 
International requirements for safe operations provide motivation and drive for the idea of 
transfer technologies. International standards and procedures are required in all industries in 
order to compete in the international market, and in order to minimize the possibilities for major 
accidents. There is, however, a lack of focus on safety and security in operations in several less 
industrialized countries (Khan, 2013).  
 
This year on May 13th, a coal mine exploded and caused a fire that killed over 450 workers in 
Turkey. Turkey has not agreed to the International Labor organization’s Safety and Health in 
Mines Convention, and is just one example of less industrialized countries not adopting 
international standards (Gloystein, 2014). One of the lessons to be learned from this disaster is 
that standards need to be integrated into a local context (Henderson, 2014). Technology transfer 
provides an opportunity to improve the robustness and safety focus in a complex technological 
activity. 
 
The potential in technology transfer for development of emerging societies can hardly be 
overstated. This type of transfer is in focus at universities, international companies, and aid 
organizations. A lot of research is conducted on the topic, not only to improve technologies, 
but also to use the technology to prevent disasters and to create technological capacity in 
organizations and society as a whole.  
 
Since technology transfer was introduced as a term, the concept has been heavily debated. 
Whenever technology is taken to new and vulnerable areas, or is transferred to other cultures 
and regimes, one should expect that risks will appear in new forms (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). 
Moreover, a simply ratification of international standards will not reduce the likelihood of 
undesired events. These standards need to be understood, and the capacity in the new context 
needs to be able to adapt these requirements. Therefore, this study seeks to address the 
importance of the transfer process and the underlying interactions that shapes the process. 
 
Knowledge transfer, technology transfer and capacity development are important terms that 
must be defined and understood. Knowledge transfer is a part of technology transfer. 
Knowledge is one part of technology, while technology also involves other aspects, which will 
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be explained later in the theoretical section. Technology transfer is a tool within the capacity 
development process. Capacity development is a process that supports organizations to identify 
and to find solutions to its own challenges. 
 
1.1 Background for choice of topic 
 
The petroleum industry involves highly technological systems, and it is a vulnerable sector, as 
experienced through the years. Mumbai High North (2005), Hebei Spirit oil spill (2007) 
and Deepwater Horizon explosion (2010) are just few examples of accidents from this century 
that display the vulnerability within complex technological systems. It causes danger to 
humans, environment, economies and the society. Complex technological systems operate in a 
dynamic environment and risk governance is a complex task, which must be considered at 
numerous levels in the society (Rasmussen, 1997).  
 
On the Norwegian Continental Shelf there is a strong focus on health, safety and environment 
(HSE) management (Engen et al., 2013). The risk governance system in the Norwegian 
petroleum industry is known for its focus on safe operations. The system is created and 
customized to the Norwegian culture and social environment, which is characterized by the 
cooperation between the industry, unions and the government, and is based on trust and 
transparency (Lindøe, Baram, & Renn, 2014). This experience with HSE management gives an 
opportunity to share a well-functioning system.  
 
The Oil for Development (OfD) program, operated by Norad is based on this idea. The 
Norwegian Government introduced the program aiming to assist and support countries entering 
the petroleum industry. Uganda is one of the countries included in this program and the current 
cooperation with Norway started in July 2009. This OfD program is the first using a structure 
built on three pillars: environment, revenue and resources. The HSE activity is included in the 
OfD program is a tool in the resource pillar. The purpose of the new program is “to put in place 
institutional arrangements and capacities to ensure well-coordinated and results oriented 
Resource management, Revenue management, Environmental management and HSE 
management in the oil and gas sector in order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives 
of the National Oil and Gas Policy” (MEMD, 2010). 
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Uganda is a particular interesting country. Lack of energy and electricity has been, and still is, 
a major obstacle to industrial development in the country (Brandal, 2013). The country will 
now venture into petroleum activities and it seems to have a great opportunity for development. 
In light of this, the cooperation and creation of robust risk governance system is therefore 
interesting to study. 
 
1.2 Relevant research within the topic 
 
Large amount of research is completed on the topic for this thesis. Olsen and Lindøe (2009) 
argue that the main challenge with technology transfer is in the adjustments required to make 
the technology work in other contexts, and the effects are largely unknown. In Olsen (1996) 
similar arguments are forwarded and the challenges with technology being a social construction 
and tacit knowledge is highlighted. This point of view is the basis for the iceberg model 
discussed later. 
 
Technology transfer is a broad discipline. In recent years, it has appeared in job titles and firms 
dealing exclusively with transfer of technology (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Branstad, 2009). 
Moreover, International Journal of Technology Transfer and Commercialisation (InderScience 
Publishers, 2014), and The Journal of Technology Transfer (Siegel, Bozeman, & Mosey, 2014) 
are examples of journals that have been dedicated to this topic. The term is widely used in recent 
publications (Hoekman & Javorcik, 2006). The topic is discussed both in theoretical settings 
and in international politics.  
 
The first to highlight the importance of international technology transfer was by the United 
Nations Secretary General. In 1961, he mentioned the use of international technology transfer 
as a tool to assist developing countries (Sampath & Roffe, 2012). This initiated the technology 
transfer trend and numerous theoretical aspects are developed since. Røvik (2007) developed a 
knowledge transfer model outlining an idea of knowledge transfer through a standardized 
process. Normally there is resistance to change and Jacobsen (2004) discuss how this will affect 
the transfer process and how it can be managed. Several researchers have studied why some 
organizations are better at learning than others (Argote & Epple, 1990; Edmondson, Pisano, 
Bohmer, & Winsow, 2003). Other researchers measures the importance of culture in the change 
processes (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2008).  
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Clarke (2012), Eggen and Roland (2014), Olsen (1996) and Nygaard (1987) has studied 
technology transfer as development aid. However, the conclusions differ. Eggen and Roland 
(2014) emphasize the need for industrial countries to be more humble and to end being paternal 
towards the developing countries. Focus of development aid is currently on activities that 
reconstruct government, culture, institutions and political systems, and it is not focusing on 
smaller achievable tasks (Eggen & Roland, 2014). Clarke (2012) describes different cultures 
and the learning aspect as the main problems with technology transfer and capacity building.  
 
Hardin (2002) writes about trust in relation to the public life and politics. He argues that trust 
is crucial in a system, both in terms of formation and maintenance. Olsen (2008), Earle (2010) 
and Kerkhof, Winder, and Klandermans (2003) have studied trust and its relevance to risk and 
risk management. Singh and Premarajan (2007) have studied trust in light of knowledge 
transfer. Therefore, we study trust as a precondition in the Norwegian risk governance system, 
and thereby a part of the technology transfer.  
 
“Risk Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations” edited by Lindøe et al. (2014) covers 
the risk regulations and safety management in US, UK and Norway. The Norwegian risk 
governance system is thoroughly analyzed. The report “Tilsynsstrategi og HMS-regelverk i 
Norsk Petroleumsvirksomhet” (Engen et al., 2013), presents and discuss the risk governance in 
the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
 
Further research on this topic is being undertaken at the University of Stavanger, Norway in the 
project “Robust Regulatory Regimes. Defenses against Major Accidents?”. The focus of the 
research is on the risk governance systems in Norway, UK and US. These are well-established 
and well-functioning regulatory systems. Their results show that all systems are highly 
integrated into their local context. Hence, it is interesting to study the effects of transferring a 
Norwegian risk governance system to a developing country, like Uganda.   
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1.3 Research purpose and problem  
 
It seems clear that technology transfer is of great importance in today’s operations, to ensure 
robust systems. The Norwegian risk governance system is complex and strongly integrated into 
the Norwegian petroleum industry. Transfer of risk governance systems is not expected to be a 
simple task. The purpose of this study is to discover and describe how risk governance systems 
can be shared between different contexts, and to identify what parameters will affect this 
transfer.  
 
We define the following research problem:  
 
 
 
 
Focus is on the risk governance system in the Norwegian petroleum industry and in the 
Ugandan petroleum industry. By studying these systems, we will identify what promote and/or 
hamper the transfer of well-established risk governance systems in an industrialized country to 
a developing country.  
 
1.4 Limitations  
 
The topic for this study is complex and comprehensive. There are several parameters that 
possibly will promote and/or hamper the transfer of risk governance systems. Some limitations 
are therefore necessary. The study is limited to the OfD cooperation between Norway and 
Uganda, and this project is used as a case (Blaikie, 2010).  
 
We will only consider technology transfer, in terms of transfer of risk governance systems, in 
the OfD program. Moreover, only the transfer in terms of HSE management will be studied. 
This captures only some parameters that hamper and/or promote the transfer. The terms 
promote and/or hamper covers parameters that affects the possibility to create a robust risk 
governance system through a transfer.  
 
“What promote/hamper the transfer of risk governance systems from the Norwegian 
petroleum sector to Uganda?” 
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Some conditions are perceived as a requirement for the Norwegian risk governance system and 
these must be considered when transferring the system (Lindøe et al., 2014).  
 
 
There are several prerequisites needed to make the Norwegian risk governance system function. 
These are presented in Figure 1. This study has limited the focus on two of the prerequisites: 
capacity and trust. Capacity development is seen as the key factor for technology transfer to 
developing countries. Therefore, we consider capacity as a natural focus. Trust among involved 
parties is a main characteristic of the Norwegian risk governance system. This justifies our 
focus on trust.  
 
Lastly, the study is limited to include the changes that have occurred in the past. This includes 
actors’ focus in the transfer process, the precautions taken and the present status regarding 
capacity and trust. Uganda has still four years left before production starts, and is therefore still 
in a planning process. The effect the technology transfer will have after production starts is not 
being speculated in.  
 
Further limitations and explanations of key terms are discussed in the theoretical section in 
chapter three. Limitation regarding data collection and framing through design will be 
explained in the design and methodology section in chapter four.  
 
Prerequisites in 
the Norwegian 
risk governance 
system
Trust, 
confidence, 
respect
Equality
Proportionality and 
impartiality
Communication
Transparency
Capacity
Safety 
culture
Figure 1: Prerequisites in the Norwegian risk governance system 
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1.5 Structure  
 
Figure 2 displays an outline of the components of this study.  
 
Figure 2: Structure of study 
 
As displayed in Figure 2, this study is based on the cooperation between Norway and Uganda 
in relation to the OfD program. The three research questions are related to the cooperation 
between the two countries, and preconditions affecting the transfer. These questions are 
assessed in terms of a theoretical approach and collected data. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter two contains a description of the context of the 
study. An explanation of the risk governance systems within the petroleum industry in Norway 
and Uganda is given. We look closer at choices of regulations regarding risk governance, actors 
involved and the opportunities and challenges regarding choice of risk governance systems for 
the two countries. Further, the transfer of risk governance systems, as a cooperation between 
Norway and Uganda, is explained. 
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Chapter three contains the theoretical approach. The iceberg theory as the framework for the 
study is presented. Thereafter, the next part explains risk governance systems in its social 
construction. Risk governance systems are deeply integrated into its local context, meaning its 
capacity, interplay, and trust. Lastly, the important aspects in terms of the transfer process are 
outlined through involved actors, knowledge, and contextualization. The research questions are 
also presented and described in this section. 
 
In chapter four, the choices made concerning design and methodology will be presented along 
with the research strategy. The data collection method is outlined and each category is 
explained. The analysis of the data along with validity and reliability is discussed. We justify 
the choices we have made in the development of the study and cover the strengths and 
weaknesses with the design.  
 
The results are presented in chapter five and further analyzed in chapter six. Both chapters are 
divided into the three research questions. The results are not exclusively discussed within one 
research question, as they are relevant for various discussions. For example findings presented 
in research question two about sharing information internally and externally are interesting to 
study in all research questions.  
 
In conclusion, the most important findings concerning parameters that hamper and/or promote 
the transfer of risk governance systems are presented. We explain the main contributions of the 
study and list interesting topics for further research. 
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2. Transfer of risk governance systems from Norway to Uganda: 
contexts, systems, cooperation 
 
 
This chapter presents the context of this study. The chapter describes petroleum activity and 
risk governance systems within the two different social constructions. Lastly, the cooperation, 
in light of transfer of risk governance systems is presented. 
 
2.1 The Norwegian petroleum industry 
 
The petroleum industry is by far the largest industry in Norway. In 2012, 23% of the total value 
creation came from this industry (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2014). The system and 
structure around the industry are unique to Norway, as it has developed over the last forty years. 
Table 1 displays phases of technological development in the Norwegian petroleum industry, as 
well as its major accidents and the regulations that followed.  
 
	
	 Phase	 Characteristics	 Major	
accidents		
Regulations	 Elements	under	
pressure		
I	 Entrepreneurial	
1970-1976	
Uncertainty	regarding	technological	solutions.	
Emerging	environmental	consciousness.	International	
companies	and	key	personnel	dominating	
	 Practical	do’s	and	don’ts	
directed	to	the	industry	
carrying	out	the	activities	
Humanware,	
Orgware,	
Infoware	and	
Technoware	
II	 First	
consolidation	
1977-1980	
Big	integrated	production	units	and	huge	
organizations	mainly	occupied	with	documentation	
and	control.	Norwegian	actors	gradually	included	
through	an	active	national	“infant	industry”	policy.		
Ekofisk	Bravo	
Blow	out	1977,	
Alexander	
Kielland	
disaster	1980	
Internal	control	was	introduced,	
Division	of	NPD	and	NMPE,	
Working	Environmental	Act	
(1977),	Safety	and	Offshore	
research	program	(1978)	
Orgware,	
Humanware	and	
Infoware	
III	 Maturation	
1981-1988	
Consolidation	the	integrated	production	units.	
Dramatic	reduction	of	contractors.	Limited	
competition	from	abroad.	Oil	price	drop	1986.	
Norwegian	actors	dominating	in	some	technological	
segments,	but	still	lacking	the	overall	system	
competence.		
	 Paradigm	shift	(1985):	first	
Petroleum	Activities	Act,	
Development	of	tripartite	
collaboration,	Principles	of	
internal	control	(Lord	Cullin	
report)		
Humanware	and	
Orgware	
IV	 Reorganizing	
1989-1996	
New	economic	realities	enforce	new	technological	and	
organizational	solutions.	NORSOK	cooperation.	
Norwegian	actors	dominating	in	most	segments.	A	
reopening	for	international	competition.			
	 New	rules	of	risk	analysis	
(1990),	and	emergency	
preparedness	(1992),	
Petroleum	Act	(1996)	
Humanware,	
Orgware,	
Infoware	and	
Technoware	
V	 Second	
consolidation	
Controversies	among	oil	companies	and	sub	
contractors	about	risk	level.	New	trust	building	and	
safety	efforts.	A	mixture	of	international	and	national	
actors.	
Helicopter	
crash,	Norne	
1997,	Offshore	
worker	killed,	
Oseberg	Øst	
2000	
Establishment	of	Safety	Forum	
(2000),	RNNP	launched	(2001),	
Working	environment	Act	
(2005),	Regulations	with	high	
focus	on	functional	based	
regulations	(2010),		
Humanware	and	
Orgware	
Table 1: Technological development in terms of risk governance in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry (Inspired by 
Lindøe and Olsen, 2008) 
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As the table illustrates, an increased focus on risk governance occurred in the late 1970s. The 
start of this new focus was the development of the Norwegian Work Environment Act in 1977. 
Following, the tripartite collaboration was developed and Norway established a tough labor 
legislation with strengthening of unions in the offshore industry (Lindøe, 2013). Around the 
same time, two major accidents, Bravo and Aleksander Kielland, ensured an improved focus 
towards the risks involved for the environment, and the people working in this industry (Lindøe, 
2013). Bravo was the first uncontrolled blow out accident on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Three years later, the Aleksander Kielland accident caused the death of 123 workers when an 
oilrig collapsed in the North Sea. A new safety regime, adopted in 1985, was developed as a 
result of these accidents (Lindøe, 2013). Following, the Lord Cullen report introduced the term 
“safety case”, which also had an impact on the current HSE focus and safety regime in Norway 
(Lindøe, 2013). The report addressed the importance of developing a strategy on the risks, 
consequences and safety of installations, and procedures to handle this.  
 
As a result, the structure in organizations has moved from hierarchy towards a more flat 
structure. In addition, these strategies and focus was developed through different phases along 
with increased interplay between actors. Development of a strengthened safety regime included 
a reorganization of government regulatory responsibilities, which will be further outlined in the 
next section (Petroleumstilsynet, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Norwegian risk governance system and its social 
construction (Engen, 2014, p. 342) 
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2.1.1 The Norwegian risk governance system  
Figure 3 pictures the Norwegian risk governance system in its social construction. The system 
is shaped by institutional structures and arrangements, as well as social processes (Engen, 2014) 
 
Figure 3 conveys a broad institutional perspective on the Norwegian risk governance systems 
industrial policy, regulation, working life and technological pathways (Engen, 2014). The 
tripartite collaboration, functional-based regulations, structure at governmental level and 
supervision strategy based on trust and capacity is part of what is unique with this system. These 
features constitute the foundation for the Norwegian risk governance system. Risk regulation 
as a practice derived from the tripartite collaboration is considered to be shaped by institutional 
procedures, principles, expectations and norms encountered in cultural and historical 
framework (Engen, 2014, p. 342). The relationship and the building of trust between the 
stakeholders are mainly performed in forums where the different actors have different roles. 
The two most important forums are the Regulatory Forum and the Safety Forum. This 
relationship is also strongly influenced by organizational capacity where the forums and 
collaborations emphasize learning and improvement (Bang & Thunestad, 2014). The risk level 
in the Norwegian petroleum industry is measured yearly and is called RNNP (risk level for 
Norwegian petroleum activity). This is an instrument for measuring the impact of the overall 
HSE work in the industry. 
 
There are a number of actors involved in the Norwegian risk governance system. The 
government departments involved are few with clear roles and responsibilities and do not 
duplicate expertise. The government agency primarily responsible for the petroleum industry is 
the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). They have an overarching role to assess the safety 
and working environment, and designing the regulations for the industry (Bang & Thunestad, 
2014). NPD arrange for the coordination between all the government agencies and ensure this 
is appropriate and communicated clearly to the industry.  
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (NPSA) is a separate administrative agency. They 
set the standards and ensure the operators in the industry maintain the required level of safety, 
emergency preparedness and the working environment in the industry (Engen et al., 2013). 
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NPSA is established as an independent body and are perceived as the guarantor of the 
functionality of the Norwegian safety regime (Engen et al., 2013). 
 
Other stakeholders in the risk governance system are the employers and the trade unions. The 
employers include all the companies involved in the petroleum industry, both offshore, on-
shore and the suppliers. The unions represent the interest of the workers in the industry. These 
actors help monitor and observe the working environment and the safety of the workers in the 
industry (Bang & Thunestad, 2014). The tripartite collaboration is defined by interaction 
between the regulatory authorities (government), unions and employers. This collaboration is 
based on trust between all stakeholders and it remains the cornerstone in the Norwegian risk 
governance system (Engen et al., 2013).  
 
The Norwegian petroleum industry is regulated by five central laws: Petroleum Act, Working 
Environment Act, Maritime Safety Act, Seamen’s Act and Pollution Control Act (Engen et al., 
2013). The main Act the industry must comply with is the Petroleum Act. This Act was 
introduced in 1985 and enforced major changes in the way the petroleum operations are 
performed in Norway. The previous regulations were revised after the fatal accidents outlined 
above. The previous system, with clear boundaries of each activity and detailed rules, was 
obviously not working in such a complex industry (Bang & Thunestad, 2014). The new 
Petroleum Act is built on a different logic with greater cooperation between the actors involved 
and it is based on self-regulation. This approach relies on the capability of the industry to 
manage their own risk according to accepted norms and standards (Lindøe, Baram, & Braut, 
2011).  
 
Along with the emergence of functional based regulations, the regulators focus on supervising 
the quality of the industry’s internal control system (Kaasen, 2014, p. 129). The functional 
based regulations are goal based. The responsibility for how to achieve these goals is given to 
the regulated companies and the regulator needs to trust the companies to meet these goals 
(Bang & Thunestad, 2014). The supervision strategy is also built on trust with supervision 
known and planned in advance. This regime is called a known system audits. The government 
trusts the operators and entrepreneurs to relate to the submitted plans (Bang & Thunestad, 
2014).  
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2.1.2 Strength and weaknesses 
The Norwegian risk governance system appears as a thoroughly analyzed system. A number of 
strengths and weaknesses are identified in the Norwegian practice of risk governance (Lindøe, 
Baram et al., 2014). 
 
High trust and legitimacy is a strength in the Norwegian system, it is present between all 
stakeholders, and it is restored when threatened. The forums created include all stakeholders 
and are seen as a fair place that contributes to adjust perceptions and to engage the risk maker. 
Following, the capacity is an appreciated strength in the system. This is observed through the 
system’s emphasis on learning and improvement, with increasing competence of all parties. 
This emphasis provides long-term effectiveness. 
 
Several uncertainties and challenges are identified in the Norwegian risk governance system. 
The system has a lack of clearly identifiable requirements and appears with a too open-ended 
structure. These factors are leading to high uncertainty and sometimes cause laws to be made 
by negotiation. Following, the choice of supervision strategies frequently causes few 
inspections, unclear objectives and soft enforcement. 
 
2.2 The Ugandan petroleum industry 
 
Uganda’s petroleum history dates back to the early 1920s. However, it was not until 2002 that 
Heritage Oil drilled the first exploratory well. As of March 2013, the blocks in Albertine Graben 
were estimated to contain at least 3,5 billion barrels, of which 1 billion barrels are classified as 
recoverable (MEMD, 2013). These numbers entails that Uganda stands to join the ranks of mid-
sized oil producers in the world (Norad, 2013). A total of 32 out of 34 wells drilled since 2002 
have encountered petroleum, which is an impressive success ratio (MEMD, 2010). The location 
of petroleum fields is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Map of Albertine Graben, Western Uganda (PEPD, 2014) 
 
The petroleum fields are located in the Albertine Graben, an inland area in the middle of one 
of the national parks in the Western part of Uganda. The 500 km long, and 45 km wide area is 
situated along Lake Albert, on the Ugandan-Congolese border, and stretches north to Uganda’s 
border with South Sudan. Lake Albert is divided almost equally between Congo and Uganda in 
terms of unitization of the petroleum. Lake Albert, is one of the African Great Lakes, and 
thereby an important site for the conservation of biodiversity (Tullow Oil Plc, 2014). There are 
permanent local communities around the oil operations. Northern Uganda (Block 1), where 
Total has licenses the military is fighting against rebels in the Lords Resistance Army. Ugandan 
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People Defense Force has declared 80 percent of the northern area safe (Biryabarema, 2013), 
but there are still numerous uncertainties and large unstable areas.  
 
Hydrocarbon production is expected to begin in 2018. The Ugandan Government has decided 
that there is a need to strengthen the capacity in the industry before they start producing. A 
refinery is developed on the government’s initiative, and it will be completed when production 
start in 2018. There are also several ongoing projects related to construction of a pipeline for 
export of oil to the Indian Ocean (Total, 2014).  
 
2.2.1 Ugandan risk governance system  
The Ugandan risk governance system is in an early developing phase. Safety results collected 
from the petroleum companies, in Figure 5, shows that there is significant room for 
improvement in the industry followed by more consistent supervision. The working hours 
tripled in 2013 due to increased seismic and drilling activities. However, there are limited oil 
and gas experience among national contractors (PEPD, personal communication, May 26, 
2014). Therefore, most work is performed without the required HSE knowledge.  
 
Figure 5: Incidents reports from 2013 (PEPD, personal communication, May 26, 2014) 
 
Figure 5 illustrates safety results for 2013 conducted by the petroleum companies. All operators 
keep track on undesired events and near incidents. Following, with analysis of the conditions 
for the outcome. The Ugandan petroleum sector has not experienced any major accidents so 
far. Thereby, their risk governance choices are proactive, since these choices are not based on 
previous accidents. Most accidents have been minor and related to operations, such as “marine 
line cutter cut his ankle with machete opening seismic line on papyrus environment” (PEPD, 
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personal communication, May 26, 2014). Incidents concerning vehicle, air transport, and 
environmental harm are also reported. The root causes of the main events are related to the 
behavior of workers due to lack of skills or knowledge. Organizational factors such as lack of 
preparation, poor maintenance and arbitrary inspection processes, are also causing accidents 
(PEPD, personal communication, May 26, 2014). Moreover, it is expected that when production 
starts in 2018 the potential for major accidents will dramatically increase. 
 
The involvement of the Ugandan Government in the risk governance system is through the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) and Petroleum Exploration and 
Production Department (PEPD). PEPD, under MEMD, have the responsibility to prepare laws 
and regulations for safe exploration of petroleum resources and to supervise the organizations 
within Uganda (MEMD, 2010). The Occupational Safety and Health Department under the 
Ministry of Labor is responsible for workers safety.  
 
The petroleum companies in Uganda include three main operators; Total (France), Tullow 
(Ireland), and CNOOC (China). All three petroleum companies operate from Uganda. 
Ownership and operation responsibilities within the exploration areas are divided equally 
between the operators.  
 
The Ugandan petroleum industry also includes 22 national and 42 international registered 
contractors (PEPD, personal communication, April 28, 2014). Uganda is estimated to have 
around 9,000 registered non-governmental organizations (NGO), although the exact number of 
active NGOs is difficult to determine. Most of the NGO’s are not working specifically towards 
the petroleum industry. However, since they focus on specific areas like environmental issues 
or human rights their work embraces the petroleum sector. 
 
Only 6% of Uganda’s labor force is unionized (Mujuni, 2014). Low unionization is due to many 
self-employed workers, which are not organized through formal employment. Following, 
unions in Uganda are poorly organized, with lack of good governance and poor leadership. 
Some industry leaders and politicians work actively against the interest of the unions (Eggen & 
Raha, 2012). 
 
Product sharing agreements (PSA) is a contract between state and operators. PSA provides for 
an advisory committee, which comprises of both stakeholders. Four formal interactions are 
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established between government and operators. These have different objectives, and are 
performed either monthly or quarterly. The formal interactions are advisory committee meeting, 
operations meeting, technical committee meeting and financial technical meeting. 
 
After recent reforms, Uganda has relatively good national laws and regulations, which measure 
up to international standards. The Petroleum, Exploration, Development and Production Act 
2013 were commenced April 5th 2013 and the Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission 
and Midstream Storage) Act was commenced on July 26th 2013.  The Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, of 2006 is the main law that regulates HSE activities in the country. Other relevant 
Act’s regarding risk management is the Access to Information Act, of 2005, Labor Unions Act, 
of 2006, The National Employment Policy Act, of 2011 and the Companies Act, of 2012. 
 
2.2.2 Strength and weaknesses 
The stakeholder in the Ugandan risk governance system is competent and serious. The three 
operators in Uganda are international companies, recognized for their capacity. Following, 
development of robust regulations is given priority. Reported achievements related to the risk 
governance system concern a HSE management system, and the internal audit process that is 
formalized and implemented within the operators. There is also ongoing training in HSE, 
management of contractors, coaching and on the job skills (PEPD, personal communication, 
May 26, 2014). 
 
Weaknesses found in the Ugandan petroleum industry and risk governance system includes the 
increased risk of corruption and hence spoiling long-term benefits for the Ugandan people. The 
HSE culture and the management of contractors and their performance are seen as a weakness 
within the system (PEPD, personal communication, May 26, 2014). There is also challenges 
for the system to be able to implement the Acts involving international standards (Shepherd, 
2013). This is due to the lack of capacity and understanding of the system.  
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2.3 Transfer of risk governance systems 
 
The Norwegian and the Ugandan risk governance systems as presented above include several 
social components. Table 2 contains a brief summary of some central characteristics and 
prerequisites of the two systems, which is seen as interesting in this study. The Norwegian 
characteristics are obtained from Lindøe et al. (2014) and the characteristics for Uganda is 
found through our own data.  
 
Norway Uganda 
Risk governance structure: 
- Functional-based regulations 
- Tripartite collaboration (strength of parties are 
equally balanced) 
- RNNP sets baselines and establishes trends.  
- PSA requires to be informed (but does not 
approve plans)  
- Much left to discretion of the regulated 
Capacity: 
- Skills in negotiation needed 
- Use of industry competence to train inspectors 
- High competence of inspectors and unions reps 
needed 
Interplay of actors: 
- Forums for debate needed to ‘regulate’ Social 
controls and participation 
Social climate: 
- High trust between parties needed 
- Regulators needs high legitimacy 
Risk governance structure:  
- PEPD monitors and regulates 
licensees undertaking 
exploration and production  
- Operators are required to update 
PEPD on operations on a daily 
basis 
- 24/7 monitoring in fields when 
drilling 
- PSA as a contract between state 
and operators 
- Functional-based regulations 
- Laws established in accordance 
to international standards 
Interplay of actors: 
- Formal interactions between 
government and operators  
Table 2: Characteristics of the Norwegian and Ugandan risk governance system 
 
There are great contrasts between the Norwegian and the Ugandan risk governance systems, as 
displayed in Table 2, in terms of experience, structures, locations and traditions. The systems 
are at two different stages in the petroleum development: one with forty years experience and 
several phases of development, and one moving towards production start. The objective of the 
OfD program is to exchange technologies based on the Norwegian experience, to develop a 
robust risk governance system in Uganda. The description of the situation in the two contexts 
and the cooperation defines a foundation for the rest of this study. 
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2.3.1 Cooperation between Uganda and Norway 
The OfD program provides support to governments and government agencies in the cooperation 
countries. “Our mission is to empower the government to make reasonable decisions” (Rasen, 
2012, p. 18). It is important to note that export of a blueprint of “the Norwegian model” is not 
the goal for the program. 
 
Uganda is the largest recipient of support from the OfD program. A three-year cooperation was 
completed in 2009. A new project for five more years was signed in July 2009. The current 
project is allocated a total funding of NOK 147 million for this five-year duration. The first 
nine month in 2013 the funding was frozen due to claims of corruption in the Ugandan 
President’s Office. This conflict is solved, and the program is continuing as planned, with 
completion at the end of 2014.  
 
The central actors of the OfD program regarding the resource pillar are the NPD, NPSA, PEPD 
and MEMD. Appendix 1 presents an overview of all involved actors, and their role in the 
cooperation.  
 
The intentions of the OfD program regarding the transfer of risk governance systems include a 
review of policies in a legal and regulatory framework. The aim of the review is to ensure that 
it is in accordance with national requirements. The program also aims at developing supervisory 
strategies and a plan for HSE matters in the operations. Following, the transfer includes 
development of tools for the performance of HSE audits, along with the HSE standards and 
monitoring mechanisms (MEMD, 2010). 
 
In 2011, NPSA presented a report regarding development of HSE regulations for the oil and 
gas sector in Uganda (Petroleumstilsynet, 2011). They recommended that the Ugandan 
Government developed a clear understanding of the important aspects relating to HSE. “To do 
so it might be necessary to create a new understanding of how to develop an integrated set of 
regulations stipulated and enforced by the involved authorities” (Petroleumstilsynet, 2011). 
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3. Theoretical approach 
 
This chapter establishes a theoretical basis for the study. The theoretical chapter is divided into 
two main parts; risk governance systems and transfer of risk governance systems. The 
framework for the work is the iceberg model. The model illustrates aspects in a risk governance 
system as well as transfer of such a complex system. However, the model is overarching, and 
should not be regarded as comprehensive.  
 
 
Figure 6: Transfer of risk governance systems (Inspired by Olsen, 1996) 
 
The iceberg model is presented in Figure 6. The visible part of the iceberg, above the surface, 
represents the more formal part of a risk governance system, which is easier to see and control. 
The parts of technology that consists of easily explainable aspects such as laws and regulations, 
procedures, supervision strategies and/or defined actors, is just the “tip of the iceberg”. 
Important aspects in technological systems could be hidden as long as it is in the environment 
where it is in use (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009).  
 
The part of the iceberg that is below the surface illustrates aspects that are invisible and deeply 
integrated into a system. Examples of these aspects are heuristics, ”rules of thumb”, knowledge 
that are gained through years of experience, and hidden conditions in a system, for example 
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values, power, politics and trust. These aspects present a greater challenge to transfer and are 
seen as the invisible part of the iceberg because the aspects may not be identified before it is 
adopted in a new context. This challenge is important to recognize when looking to transfer 
systems, in order to select, implement and adapt risk governance systems to a new environment.  
 
According to Hughes (1987), technological systems, such as the risk governance system, 
include “technical devices, the organizational routines and procedures, legislative artifacts and 
scientific and other knowledge elements such as skills, rules of thumb and norms for the 
handling of the technology” (Engen, 2014, p. 341). This definition means that one must see the 
technological system in light of technoware, inforware, humanware and orgware (Cohen, 
2004).  
 
 
Figure 7 presents elements in a technological system and is inspired by the elements presented 
by Cohen (2004). The technoware is the object-embodied technology. In this study this means 
laws and regulations, as well as structures such as NPSA, NPD and Unions. Inforware includes 
technology information and codified descriptions, for example information of a supervision 
procedure. The inforware is in the middle of the figure. This is because this element is critically 
dependent on others and requires knowledge of these to be understood.  
 
In order to describe and understand the technologies, we must also include the social structures 
that make technology work in the context where it is in use. This means we must have a 
cognitive understanding that allows activities to be meaningful to the participants (Olsen & 
Figure 7: Elements in a technological system (Inspired by Cohen, 2014) 
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Lindøe, 2009). Humanware includes knowledge, skills and motivation. Knowledge is essential 
in the transfer process. Technoware is not a tool unless there is somebody who can handle it. It 
would be difficult to surf with only a surfboard but no surfer. According to Bhatt (2002) 
knowledge is an organized combination of ideas, rules, procedures, and information.  
 
Orgware is the organizational arrangements needed to successfully integrate the other 
components and must also be seen within the social structure. The social structure is essential 
as it consists of mechanisms generating behavior, such as trust. All four components explained 
by Cohen (2004) are required simultaneously for achieving successful transfer of technology. 
Thus, these aspects “form a seamless web that constitutes technological pathways” (Engen, 
2014, p. 342).  
 
3.1 Risk governance systems 
 
Risk and risk governance are broad terms. Risk is viewed in this study is as a combination of 
uncertainty and consequence of a given outcome (Aven, Boyesen, Njå, Olsen, & Sandve, 2004). 
Uncertainty is highly relevant in risk governance as risk is not objective, and therefore an 
important aspect to take into account (Njå & Solberg, 2012). Risk has to be managed, however, 
we can never predict with reasonable certainty what will happen (Aven et al., 2004). 
 
Risk governance is a way to anticipate and mitigate for undesired events. Undesired events 
means events that can represent a risk for individuals, environment, economical values and 
important functions in the society (Aven et al., 2004).  Aven and Renn (2010, p. 49) present a 
definition of the term governance where “governance describes structures and processes for 
collective decision making involving all stakeholders”. With this approach governing choices 
is seen as interplay between governmental institutions, economic forces and civil society actors, 
for example NGOs. 
 
Rasmussen (1997) emphasizes the complexity of risk governance system on the basis of seeing 
it as a socio-technical system where all the elements presented in Figure 7 needs to be 
considered. Risk governance is not a unilateral process where the only focus is on the chosen 
elements in the industry. It is crucial to consider what is required to make the elements function 
as intended. The risk governance system concerns a large number of stakeholders. For the 
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Ugandan risk governance system the stakeholders include the government, petroleum 
companies, NGOs, unions, contractors, workers and society at large. 
 
Risk governance also include structure, capacity, social climate and interaction with different 
stakeholders that manage risks, in line with the definition of a technological system by Hughes 
(1987). 
 
Figure 8: Risk governance system in its social construction (Inspired by Aven & Renn, 2010) 
 
As Figure 8 pictures, the risk governance system must be seen within its social construction. 
“A system is more than the sum of its elements” (Rasmussen, 1997, p. 184). In line with the 
view of Cohen (2004) on a technological system, the whole system needs to be taken into 
account.  
 
The relevant layers of the risk governance system will be discussed further in the sub-chapters 
below. 
 
3.1.1 Capacity 
Capacity means the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their 
affairs successfully (Pultar & Rabitsch, 2011). This definition considers both the capacity in 
the risk governance system, as well as the individual capacity of the different stakeholders. 
Capacity may reflect the interplay between the stakeholders and their capability to fulfill their 
role in the risk governance system (Aven & Renn, 2010).   
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Aven and Renn (2010) highlight two main aspects of capacity. The first part consists of the 
importance of using the best available knowledge and practice in the industry. Uganda looks to 
Norway to obtain knowledge about their risk governance system since Norway has experiences 
from the petroleum industry. Obtaining the best knowledge for the situation and ensuring the 
individuals involved gain the practice necessary is important in risk governance and in order to 
avoid major accidents. Thereby, this will affect the capacity to select which technologies to 
transfer. 
 
The second part of capacity referred to by Aven and Renn (2010, p. 63) is “institutions and 
organizations have to be strengthened so that they are empowered and have the resources to 
perform their tasks in the most possible effective, efficient and fair manner”. The second part 
highlights the capability and the importance of strengthening the stakeholders included in the 
industry. The OfD program looks at strengthening the industry from the governmental level. 
This ensures that the structure of PEPD is appropriate and the laws and regulations are in place 
as a framework for the industry.  
 
The resources referred to in the second part by Aven and Renn (2010) refers to the ability to 
implement the new technology to be transferred. This new technology requires the 
infrastructure to be appropriate. Furthermore, the technology requires access to information and 
the ability to process and apply this information to the Ugandan situation.  
 
The effective, efficient and fair manner stresses the importance of getting the industry to 
perform the work in the best possible way, and in a way that is fair and acceptable. For this step 
to be performed it is necessary that the organizations have the knowledge and practice 
experience needed along with the required resources.  
 
3.1.2 Interplay of stakeholders 
Capacity must be seen together with the interplay of all relevant actors (Aven & Renn, 2010). 
To ensure control over the system, it is important to gain an understanding of the structure and 
the actors that make up the system (Rasmussen, 1997).  
 
Man-made disaster theory argues that undesired events occurs as a result of a failure in existing 
cultural values and norms around hazards, how to deal with them and the impact of them 
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(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000). It is important to include all stakeholders in the processes of 
establishing a risk governance system, and to ensure they are informed. However the decisions 
on procedures and regulations need to be limited to stakeholders with the capacity and resources 
(Aven & Renn, 2010).  
 
Different actors from different levels contribute in the process with knowledge or values (Aven 
& Renn, 2010). The OfD program has its focus on the governmental level. However, the 
companies perform the risk activities and their daily operations are affected by the changes and 
framework conditions that the Ugandan Government implements. For example, new 
regulations regarding drilling procedures prepared by the Ugandan Government constitute a 
regulatory framework for petroleum companies in Uganda and a tool for the government.  
 
It is important to ensure that all stakeholders understand the rationality of a risk-based decision. 
As well as to gain enough insight to take valid and reflective decisions, based on the information 
and personal preferences (Aven & Renn, 2010). In other words, inclusion and communication 
with stakeholders is important as this affect stakeholders understanding and concern of risks. 
Following, in order to ensure the functioning of such a complex and interdependent formation 
as the stakeholder network, some general principles have to be set up to support the risk 
governance process. In Norway, for example trust and transparency in the stakeholder network 
are essential. 
 
3.1.3 Trust 
Rasmussen (1997) specifies that in addition to study the behavior of human errors in a system, 
it is also necessary to focus on the mechanisms generating behavior in the actual, dynamic work 
environment. Trust can be seen as a mechanism that affects this behavior. As a risk governance 
system is depending on conditions, such as trust in the environment, understanding of these 
conditions is essential.  
 
Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) states that trust and distrust are two very different concepts. In 
trust, one has positive expectations regarding the other’s actions and thereby implying a belief 
in the other actor or stakeholder. Equally, distrust is also a confident expectation. However, one 
that is negative and implies suspicion of the other. Norway has adopted a trusting culture. This 
culture is seen through the flexibility for the operators in the industry. The United States has a 
culture relying on distrust with strict rules and regulations. There is no statistical evidence 
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which regime works best. However, it has been found that the choice is dependent on the 
political culture (Engen, 2014).  
 
According to Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) trust can be studied from a rational or a relational 
perspective. A rational perspective presents an instrumental way of building and managing trust 
or distrust. The perspective is seen as a non-personal cooperative strategy, where the choice is 
to trust or distrust each other. To achieve this interplay, there is a need that stakeholders behave 
through the same guidelines, meet stated deadlines and perform as promised. The value in 
completing a task or a goal is not seen as personal satisfaction, but rather seen in the light of 
the consequences of doing so (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). In other words, trust occurs because 
it has proved to pay off in the past (Kerkhof et al., 2003).  
 
The relational perspective of trust between organizations emphasizes a social motivation drive 
rather than just purely instrumental, as in the rational perspective. Trust is achieved because 
one is treated in a respectful way. The perspective is grounded in processes that engage to create 
common interests, goals, objectives and similar reactions. An example is a common interest 
among stakeholders to work as a team towards the same goals and need one another to achieve 
a robust risk governance system.  
 
A relational perspective is based on the relations between trusting organizations and 
incorporates cognitive, motivational and affective components (Juhl, 2008). Perceived 
competence and reliability builds cognitive trust between different organizations (Olsen, 2008). 
Similar motivation is an influential condition in terms of relational trust. Care among 
stakeholders and actors, where a comparable personal value system is in place, develops 
affective trust (Olsen, 2008). For example the government can trust the competence within the 
petroleum companies. However, they can distrust their action and motivations. This perspective 
means that the degree of trust relies on components such as the different stakeholders capacity 
and motivations and how these relate (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). 
 
According to Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000), trust is not created overnight, rather over long time, 
based on interactions between the stakeholders and actors involved. Participants’ choices about 
which approach to adopt are typically constrained by the features of their environment (Heimer, 
2003). The trust in risk governance systems is therefore dependent on whether the environment 
is created around a rational or relational perspective, or neither. There are several factors that 
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affect the creation of the trust or distrust environment, for example stakeholders’ ownership to 
the process or top-down/bottom up components. Power distribution, patterns of dependence 
between negotiation parties, and degree of participation or non-participation are other factors 
that are deeply integrated into the system and influence the environment (Juhl, 2008).  
 
One must see trust and risk governance as related, because risk governance, through choices of 
regulations, can undermine trust (Juhl, 2008). Many of the effects associated with trust, are also 
associated with risk governance. Bottom up and top down are two apposing approaches within 
risk governance. With a top down approach, also called “command and control”, regulators 
claim the industry to rule-compliance (Lindøe et al., 2011). A bottom up approach is associated 
with self-regulation, comparable to the Norwegian risk governance system. The latter approach 
relies on the capability of the industry to manage their own risk according to accepted norms 
and standards (Lindøe et al., 2011).  
 
3.2 Transfer of risk governance systems 
 
Transfer of risk governance systems is in this thesis interpreted as transfer of technological 
systems. Technology transfer is the central concept of the study. It is often argued that the term 
is complicated and confusing since the term involves two multidimensional concepts; 
technology and transfer (Cohen, 2004). There are different ways to approach technology 
transfer. Cohen (2004) defines technology transfer as systematically organized exchange of 
information between two organizations, generally between different countries. This definition 
presupposes an active transmission of the technology.  According to Olsen (1996), technology 
transfer is normally defined as transfer of technology from one country where it is developed 
or in use, to another country where it is implemented and adapted to use. Therefore, the 
technology transfer includes some kind of exchange, which could involve learning as well as a 
physical transfer, for example implementation of a new legislation.  
 
According to Olsen and Lindøe (2009), recipients will never be able to receive the whole 
“technology package” and there will always be something that is not transferred. The OfD 
program is a cooperation between Norway and Uganda. The program is a two-way learning 
process, where Norway becomes better bureaucrats and Uganda receives support from someone 
experienced in the petroleum industry (Rasen, 2012). Technology transfer between different 
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units provide opportunities for mutual learning and inter-unit cooperation (Singh & Premarajan, 
2007). The focus of this study is on what can promote and/or hamper the technology transfer in 
order to understand how Uganda can take advantage of the Norwegian risk governance system. 
Hence, the learning outcome and advantages from the Norwegian side is not further discussed. 
For the purpose of this study the theory concerning technology transfer is used. 
 
Technology transfer in this thesis means any process where one country gains access to a 
technological system from the country where it is developed and/or in use and contextualize it 
into its own technological system. Contextualization is when risk governance elements are 
adjusted and implemented into a different local context, in this case the Ugandan risk 
governance system (Røvik, 2007). As informed concerning the risk governance system, it has 
to be seen in its social construction and within human, organizational, informational and 
technological aspects (Cohen, 2004). The contextualization is therefore an important, and 
interesting part of technology transfer where the elements are being applied to a different social 
construction.  
 
3.2.1 Actors involved in the technology transfer  
“An important way to understand technology transfer, is to focus on the actors who define the 
problems, consider alternative options and are responsible for the choices of technologies, as 
"social carriers of technology"” (Olsen, 1996). Outside-in and inside-out is used as terms as 
the relations between the “sender” and its “recipients” are not hierarchically organized. The 
Ugandan Government is in the OfD program seen as having an inside-out position. The 
“sender” which in this case is Norway, does not operate the industries in Uganda. Norwegian 
actors are engaged in a planning and implementation process from an "outside-in" position. 
They are loosely coupled to challenges within the risk governance system (Olsen, 1996). 
 
Knowledge 
Røvik (2007) states that the competence of the individuals or organizations in the transfer 
process is the critical success factor. In terms of technological systems “knowledge represents 
an understanding of the principles that underline their functioning, processes employed to 
create them, and the use that these technological systems serve” (Garud, 1997, p. 83). Garud 
(1997) explains these phases as know-what, know-how and know-why. Know-what is 
knowledge about facts, and thereby it represents the “tip of the iceberg”. Know-how means that 
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an actor has an understanding of the processes that comprise the technologies. Therefore, know-
how can be seen as knowledge about how to perform a task. This knowledge will accumulate 
through experience over time. With an understanding of the principles underlying the 
technology, know-why is achieved. “Our knowledge of how to bake a cake does not presuppose 
a knowledge of why the various ingredients interact to produce the specific type of cake” 
(Garud, 1997, p. 89). However, without this knowledge it will not be possible to create a new 
recipe, which is needed when choosing and implementing technological elements into a 
different context. 
 
The participants presuppose different understandings based on previous experiences (Gilje & 
Grimen, 1993). With different cultures and experiences, the interpretations and meanings may 
differ. In effect, knowledge is subjective. Olsen (1996) states that stakeholder must be seen in 
light of their common technological frame. This frame is a result of current theories, tacit 
knowledge, practice, goals and actions shared by the stakeholder. In line with the iceberg model 
presented above, this express how the understanding of explicit and implicit knowledge is 
important to have in mind in a transfer process. Explicit knowledge is based on know-what, 
meaning knowledge about tools, manuals and written operational rules such as a supervision 
strategy or legislation. Explicit knowledge is easier to translate than implicit knowledge. Still, 
the knowledge has to rely on people to be understood (Olsen, 1996). 
 
Implicit knowledge is heuristics, perceptual skills and tacit knowledge (Olsen, 1996). Tacit 
knowledge contains the knowledge that cannot be codified and separated easily from the minds 
of the people (Singh & Premarajan, 2007). In that way, tacit knowledge is embedded in the 
social and cultural context (Cohen, 2004). This explanation implies that the deeper the degree 
of tacit knowledge, the harder it is to communicate between actors from different levels and 
with different cultural backgrounds. Identification of the different actors risk perceptions, 
concerns and understanding of risks are important factors to consider (Aven & Renn, 2010). 
Risk perception is based on personal beliefs, experiences and feelings towards risks. 
 
Risk perception can also be termed ambiguous knowledge. This term represents tacit 
knowledge that can be understood in more than one-way and is difficult to document (Singh & 
Premarajan, 2007). One major challenge is therefore to transfer the tacit knowledge in a way 
that is understood by the receiver.  
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Knowledge is received through education, experience and values in the environment (Olsen & 
Lindøe, 2009) This opinion is supported by Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector (1990a), which states 
that learning through training has high effect on successful implementation of a system and 
correspondingly the acceptance of change. In other words, knowledge is built on participation 
and dialogue with other people. As the iceberg model illustrates, learning is a major part of the 
technology transfer process. The learning process needs to be found at all levels; vertical, 
inside-out and outside-in. Learning happens through norms, performance of tasks, discussions 
and as a result of mistakes. Learning can therefore be defined as “a relatively permanent change 
in behavior that occurs on the basis of experience” (Imsen, 2005, p. 168). This definition 
implies that learning is not just change in behavior. Learning also includes processes that 
confirm existing knowledge and processes of achieving a better understanding (Imsen, 2005). 
For example, it is no use in reading that smoking kills, if you are not doing something about it.  
 
Learning happens in an environment and through interaction with other people. The actors have 
some interests and motives they follow (Olsen, 1996). Moreover, these interests and motives 
are guided by the information about alternatives, and the knowledge the actors have about 
technologies. Their roles in the transfer process, and the potential benefits they can achieve 
through their participation, are also affecting the interest and motives. Motivation is therefore 
an important factor in a transfer process. In line with know-what, know-how and know-why, 
motivation can be added as a last aspect featuring care-why. Motivation is an inner process that 
starts and maintain learning (Asbjørnsen, Ogden, & Manger, 1999). The motivation affects the 
choice of activities, effort and persistence regarding learning. There are separate value systems 
in different cultures shaped by our cultural baggage (Olsen, 1996). For example, OfD is 
criticized for the participants from the recipient country to use the knowledge they obtain not 
to help their organizations, but rather to help themselves and their families to higher paid jobs 
or to opportunities abroad. For them it is a stepping-stone to a better personal future and the 
opportunity to obtain “per diem” while attending international conferences and courses. 
 
3.2.2 Contextualization 
“Many chapters, in tracing the history of regimes, shows that each country is such a 
complex product of it’s technology, history, political institutions, legal system, 
industry structure, culture and management that unquestioning adoption of one 
regime’s element in another country could be an expensive disaster” (Bang & 
Thunestad, 2014, p. 404) 
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An important part of learning is the ability to adapt to changes in the local context (Garud, 
1997). Certain conditions that need to be in place for implementing transferred technology. 
There is a considerable risk for maladjustment of the transferred technology to the new 
environments even though it has been taken care of (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). 
 
The iceberg model illustrates the challenges of transfer because most aspects are hidden below 
the surface. Following, Olsen and Lindøe (2009) emphasizes conditions that might create or 
change risks in the technology transfer process. There are uncertainties related to transferring 
parts of systems in terms of understandings on how to operate the technology. This represents 
the uncertainties appearing with lack of know-how or know-why. Furthermore, inadequate 
adaption between the transferred technology and the new environments also present 
uncertainties. Since it is impossible to transfer the whole “technology package”, the transfer 
can introduce latent conditions for accidents. For example, different understandings regarding 
trust as a condition. Following, a contextualization will cause changes in known risks when the 
technology is contextualized into a new environment (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). 
 
The “sender” will rarely have all information about the new environments and the “recipients” 
will not be able to obtain complete knowledge about the technology. However, technologies in 
use will normally gradually improve as the actors gain more knowledge and experience (Olsen 
& Lindøe, 2009). This means that when changes appear in one or more of the technological 
elements, changes are required in the other elements to ensure the balance for the technological 
system to work as intended.  
 
For the transfer to be acceptable, it is required that the technology is possible to implement, it 
is seen as profitable, socially acceptable and customized public requirements (Olsen & Lindøe, 
2009). It is for example difficult to implement a technological system that requires trust and 
bottom-up orientation in a context where this is non-existent.  
 
Changes can be time consuming to implement, which means that conditions in a context can 
change as a result of new structures. According to Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector (1990b), the 
most effective way to change conditions and behavior is to put actors into a new organizational 
context. This imposes new roles, responsibilities and relationships between them, which create 
a situation that “forces” new attitudes and behaviors on people. Following this, Olsen and 
Lindøe (2009) states that the interplay between technological elements is not static. Therefore, 
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it is required that the technological elements must constantly be adapted to changing 
environments in the risk governance system. 
 
3.3 Research questions 
 
Theories and definitions related to risk governance systems and technology transfer are 
presented in this chapter. Technology transfer is presented through the iceberg model, 
illustrating the difficulties with transferring technology due to deeply integrated underlying 
conditions. The actor’s role in a technology transfer process is outlined including their existing 
knowledge, skills, learning and understandings from an outside-in, inside-out or vertical 
position. This is assumed to affect the focus in a transfer process. It has been detailed that the 
interplay of these actors and their capacity needs to be considered when seeing the risk 
governance system in its context. Technology transfer is about contextualizing a technological 
system. Seeing the technological system within its social construction indicates how technology 
transfer creates a new risk picture and includes a high degree of uncertainty due to its 
complexity. This view is identified in the theory focusing on the mechanisms in the system 
making the system work as intended. A system depending on trust or distrust is one example of 
a mechanism laying as a foundation for the risk governance choices.  
 
Through the theories discussed above, together with the collected data, the focus for this study 
is on understanding what hamper and/or promote transfer of risk governance systems from 
Norway to Uganda. The research problem is answered in terms of three research questions. The 
three research questions defines the critical part of the study and are required to be clear and 
concise (Blaikie, 2010). The three research questions are:  
 
- What is the focus within the transfer of Norwegian risk governance systems to 
Uganda? 
- What impact has the present capacity in the Ugandan risk governance system on the 
implementation of new technology? 
- In what way is trust present in the Ugandan risk governance system?  
 
The first research question considers what is being emphasized within the transfer. The aim is 
to gain an understanding of what is needed and important to consider when transferring risk 
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governance systems. It is suitable to study this question through risk governance theory, and 
the description of a technological system. In addition, technology transfer and the iceberg model 
are used to study this question.  
 
The second research question considers our understanding of capacity as crucial to the risk 
governance system and to its ability to adapt new technologies and sustain the changes. 
Studying the capacity includes analyzing the actors involved and their view on the technology 
transfer. This question is studied through theories outlined about knowledge, capacity, interplay 
of actors and contextualization.  
 
The third research question emphasizes understandings and choices made concerning trust. The 
central theory for this question is the iceberg model, trust perspectives, and risk governance 
choices.  
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4. Design and methodology 
 
This chapter describes and discuss our choices concerning the design and methodology for this 
study. Our research design is prepared in accordance with Blaikie (2010). The chapter justifies 
the use of a case study approach, involving a qualitative method, and strengths and weaknesses. 
Moreover, challenges with validity and reliability are included.  
 
4.1 Research strategy  
 
Blaikie (2010) views a case study not as a methodological choice but as a choice of studied 
subject. Our research problem requires us to study the parameters that is hampering and/or 
promoting the technology transfer between Norway and Uganda, and to what extent this affects 
the risk governance system in Uganda. Therefore, we approach this thesis through a case study. 
Our research problem is a “what”-question. This type of question “discover and describe the 
characteristics of and patterns in a social phenomenon” (Blaikie, 2010, p. 60) 
 
The choice of research strategy affects the method of analyzing and the way we view the 
collected data (Blaikie, 2010). We aim at understanding the involved actors’ motivation and 
the foundation for their choices in the transfer process. The abductive research strategy is 
therefore the strategy we find relevant to us. This strategy starts in the social world of the actors, 
from their view of reality, and assess how this perspective gives meaning to the individuals 
(Blaikie, 2010).  
 
Danemarks (1997) view on the abductive strategy is highly relevant. We gather data from the 
view of the people involved and thereafter we interpret the situation, related to the transfer of 
risk governance systems between Norway and Uganda. However, there are other possible 
conclusions as well. The conclusions we consider will only be a part of the story (Danemark et 
al., 1997).  
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4.2 Methodology 
 
Based on this qualitative method, we aim at getting an in-depth understanding of the parameters 
that can promote and/or hamper the transfer process of risk governance systems. We found the 
qualitative method useful in this study as it enabled us to get a deeper understanding of the 
situation in Uganda and the cooperation with Norway. The data collection procedure is further 
presented in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Overview of data collection 
  
As presented in Figure 9, we chose to gather data through a combination of interviews, literature 
study, observation, social media and informal talks. The interview objects at operational level 
are actively involved in the knowledge transfer process. The strategic level interview objects 
are the ones developing the overall plans and the structure of the program.  
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4.2.1 Literature study 
A literature study was conducted to increase our understanding of the topic of technology 
transfer, and the differences between risk governance operations in varying local contexts. 
These documents are more reflective and thoughtful, as well as less spontaneous then 
interviews and observation (Jacobsen, 2005). Therefore, the literature study provides a good 
supplement to the interviews. The research questions and interview guide is based on the 
understanding obtained from the literature study.   
 
The OfD cooperation between Uganda and Norway is well documented. Hence, we were able 
to gather annual mandate and reports, risk assessments of the program as well as documents, 
reports and presentations used in the transfer process. We received the literature from some of 
our informants and professors at the University of Stavanger. A list of the literature used in the 
literature study of the OfD program is found in Appendix 2. 
 
The selection of core literature is a major challenge related to literature review (Blaikie, 2010). 
We focused on the literature that explained the cooperation between the two countries. These 
documents were relevant as they gave us a deep and broad understanding of the program. Some 
general documents concerning the OfD program were also helpful in order to gain a broader 
understanding.  
 
In studying documents and reports, it is important to remember that somebody has written these 
reports, at a certain time, often with a certain purpose in mind. Thus, they can give a polished 
picture of the OfD program, while ignoring negative aspects. Following, the risk assessment of 
the program is collected as secondary information in 2013. It is important to remember that 
these reports and assessments register different factors than us, and that the environment is 
dynamic. Therefore, findings may not be as relevant at later years.  
 
4.2.2 Informants 
The informants are chosen based on their relevance to the transfer of risk governance systems 
between the two countries. Informants have either a strategic or an operational role in the 
cooperation, or they are stakeholders in the Ugandan risk governance system. The informants 
are divided into two groups. The first group represents the Norwegian informants. The second 
group represents informants from Uganda. As a limitation of our study, we have merely 
interviewed employees and actors in the Ugandan petroleum industry at a management level. 
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The background and relevance of the informants will be explained, as this is of importance for 
the results. See Appendix 3 for a list of our informants and their position. 
 
It was important for us to talk to informants that have a comprehensive knowledge of the topic. 
We interviewed two representatives from NPSA. These informants are involved with the OfD 
program under the HSE pillar. In addition we interviewed an actor in the OfD program from 
the Norwegian embassy, and the OfD resident coordinator, both located in Uganda. The latter 
works closely with the OfD program in Uganda on a daily basis and has in-depth knowledge 
about the program and the operations.  
 
In addition, we had a number of informal talks. These talks included a representative from the 
evaluation department in Norad, an OfD representative from Petrad, professors from the 
University of Stavanger, as well as representatives from NPSA. These informants are relevant 
in our information gathering regarding the OfD program and the cooperation between Norway 
and Uganda.   
 
The informants from the Ugandan petroleum industry are resourceful and central in our study. 
They have the final say on all changes, and involved in the daily operations. Informants from 
the Ugandan Government are either at an operational level involving HSE, or at a strategic level 
within the OfD cooperation. Informants from the three petroleum companies all work with 
HSE. In addition, we interviewed three informants from two independent organizations, one 
NGO and one workers union. See list in Appendix 3. 
 
Our interviews were semi structured using a conversation-based approach. This approach is 
necessary when our research questions relates to topics that cannot be explicitly asked about, 
such as trust and capacity (Andersen, 2006). The structure of our interview guide was developed 
for this purpose. The interview guide was designed around five main topics: cooperation, 
development and changes, risk governance, actors and prerequisites (Appendix 4). The 
informants have different roles and responsibilities in the transfer process, and the interview 
guide was adjusted and customized to each interview.  
 
4.2.3 Observation 
Observations were performed during our fieldwork visit in Uganda. Blaikie (2010) refers to 
participant observations as ‘par excellence’ in qualitative research, meaning it is the best type 
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of research. We obtained permits to make observations in the oilfields in Albertine Graben with 
one of the petroleum companies. They hosted us at their camp, showed us around the field 
areas, and let us observe their daily operations and having informal conversations with the 
employees and contractors.  
 
We use observations as only one part of the data collection. Observations are a very 
unpredictable way of collecting information (Blaikie, 2010). However, observations provided 
a mean for cross checking the information we received through the interviews and they ensured 
the reliability of the data collected. 
 
One challenge with observation was that neither of us has experience from the petroleum 
industry. Our understanding of technical terms and operations is therefore limited. During the 
observation in the oil fields, this proved a challenge. We were aware of the risk of losing control 
over the situation and to end in a submissive role when the conversation turned to technical 
(Andersen, 2006). To overcome this challenge, we tried to be active in the conversation and to 
be involved in the situation (Andersen, 2006). 
 
4.2.4 Social media 
“Oil in Uganda” is a NGO in Uganda that solely focus on the petroleum industry. The NGO is 
neutral, independent and mainly a communication organization. The purpose of the initiative is 
to promote transparent, constructive and well-informed public and policy debate (Oil In 
Uganda, 2014a). Oil in Uganda has a public Facebook page we used during our data collection. 
The NGO creates discussions on Facebook on several topics we are studying. Facebook is 
currently the largest social media site on the Internet (Zoppos, 2012). In addition, it is the most 
visited website in majority of Africa (Essongou, 2010). We found Oil In Uganda’s Facebook 
site important to gain opinions from the social construction around the Ugandan risk 
governance system. Moreover, it provided supplementary data.  
 
There are different ways to collect data from Facebook. We merely collected information 
written on the “walls” on the Facebook page. We did not analyze the semantics of the messages 
or the characteristics of sender writing the messages. We registered the opinions and topics.  
 
This Facebook page is open to the public, which means that it has no privacy restrictions. It 
remains a challenge to interpret the seriousness of the posts on Facebook. Social media users 
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are not necessary representative of the population (Phillips, 2014). Following, we did not know 
the role of the people commenting on the topics. There may be false profiles created, with an 
aim to promote certain topics. However, with the understanding that Facebook samples are 
more diverse than usual, the collected data opens for a broader insight into many interesting 
aspects, which we would not have found otherwise. 
 
4.3 Research process 
 
“The timing of data collection is a fundamental choice in designing social research”(Blaikie, 
2010, p. 199). The timing for collecting data must be seen in the light of the rest of the process. 
We started the study with informal talks and literature study to gain an overview over the 
technology transfer of risk governance system.  
 
Due to the nature of our study and the location of the relevant actors, we spent five weeks in 
Uganda meeting the relevant informants, conducting interviews and observing the oil 
operations. We visited Uganda in February/March 2014. We consider this visit to be late 
enough to have gained sufficient overview over the topic and program, and early enough to 
have time to organize and analyze the data before thesis submission in June 2014. However, a 
five weeks visit can only give partial understanding of the local context. It is difficult and time 
consuming to comprehend the complex situation, particularly since we are unfamiliar with 
Ugandan culture.  
 
During our visit to Uganda, we used the ‘snowball’ method to reach out to relevant informants. 
This method entails that the informants opened doors to other relevant informants, which gave 
access to further information and knowledge on the topic. We experienced this process as very 
efficient and we succeeded to interview all informants we were interested in. Table 3 below 
outlines the data collection process, what has been done, what the aim has been with the work 
performed, and what the outcome as been. 
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When What  Why Outcome 
Autumn 
2013 
Literature studies. Meetings and 
informal talks with relevant 
organizations; Petrad, NPSA, Norad and 
UiS 
 
 
Contact relevant actors 
Gain knowledge on our topic, examine the 
relevance of the topic, find a relevant case, and 
narrow the topic. 
 
 
 
Find out who's relevant actors in our case and 
seek their interest in our topic 
Enhanced knowledge about 
knowledge sharing vs. capacity 
building and challenges regarding 
aid work. Positive feedback on our 
chosen topic. 
 
Feedback and interest in meeting 
us 
Jaunary 
2014 
 
Develop a research proposal, with 
research questions and objectives 
 
Plan meetings with actors in Uganda 
 
 
 
Developed a theoretical overview and 
unstructured interview guide  
 
 
Gained structure and presented research design 
to relevant actors  
 
Try to have some central informants to hang on 
to and reduce uncertainties regarding data 
collection.  
 
Established a framework for our thesis and a 
structure for our field work 
 
 
A structured research design 
 
 
Established contacts that could 
assist in the field work 
 
 
A theoretical approach and an 
interview guide as well as 
overview of who to contact and 
their relevance for our thesis 
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Preparation for field work through 
litterature studies and prepare context of 
the case; Norway, Uganda and OfD 
Gain a better overview of the context Enhanced knowledge about our 
context 
February
/March 
2014 
Data collection through field work in 
Uganda.  
 
Review of data gathered in interviews 
and through observation 
Achieve findings tied to our research questions 
 
 
To ensure we obtained all the relevant 
information for our research problem 
Interviews, informal talks, 3 days 
observation in the oil fields 
 
Talked to more informants and 
opened up for other views than 
first expected 
March 
2014 
Presentation of field work and unrefined 
evaluation of data 
Start decomposing process and analyzing data Presentation 
April-
June 
2014 
Finalized and clarified research 
questions 
 
 
Data decomposing and analysis 
 
Ensured we answered the research problem 
 
 
 
Reduce compelexity of the data, to gain a better 
overview, and to analyze the data through the 
research questions, in order to draw 
conclusions to the research problem 
The thesis was defined and we 
could start analyzing in terms of 
the final research questions 
 
Identify parameters that hamper 
and/or promote transfer of risk 
governance systems between 
different contexts  
Table 3: Data collection process
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4.4 Data reduction and analysis 
 
The data is analyzed through a qualitative content analysis. The objective is to interpret the 
subjective meaning from the content of data (Hsiu-Fang & Shannon, 2005). The interpretation 
of the literature, observation, social media and interviews is done through the coding of text 
(Lewins & Silver, 2007). We use the directed approach as our starting point for the study. This 
approach can validate or extend a theory and will identify the coding required through key 
concepts and keywords in the relevant theory (Hsiu-Fang & Shannon, 2005).  
 
The coding scheme and key words are derived from the theory and the relevant findings during 
the data collection process. The interview guide is based on the predetermined codes. These 
were coded immediately as we progressed with the interviews and observations (Fangen, 2004). 
We did not transcript all the interviews, instead the results were analyzed by listening to the 
interviews on tape and studying our notes. The interview guide was adjusted if necessary prior 
to the next interview while impressions were still fresh in mind.  
 
The focus is on transfer of technology, as well as the capacity and trust appearing in the 
Ugandan risk governance system. Thus, three questions lay the foundation and structure for the 
analysis. It is most appropriate to present the findings and the analysis in separate chapters, 
structured in accordance with the three research questions. Each result is not related to one 
research question alone. It is possible to include the results into discussion on several of the 
research questions. By this approach we discover and describe elements in the technology 
transfer, as well as achieve greater understanding of the Ugandan risk governance system. Thus, 
we identify parameters that could hamper and/or promote transfer of risk governance systems.  
 
4.5 Ethics 
 
The fact that we are from Norway could pose an ethical dilemma in terms of the OfD program, 
being funded from the Norwegian Government. It can be seen as an uneven power relationship, 
where we are looking into the cooperation between the two countries, while a number of the 
informants are looking to obtain funding from Norway. It could be perceived as we are trying 
to exploit on the situation of being from the country where the funding is coming from and 
there is not an equal relationship between the interviewer and interview objects. However, we 
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have been open and honest about being students and that this thesis will not affect the funding 
received and the program in any way. 
 
To protect the interview objects identity, they have been anonymized. The thesis has been 
written inoffensive to all interview objects. Moreover, the interview objects have had the option 
to pull out or change their statements after the interviews, if desired.  
 
 4.6 Validity and reliability  
 
The legitimacy of the thesis is tested by ensuring it is reliable and valid (Thagaard, 1998). 
Reliability relates to the results and conclusions drawn, and whether these are produced through 
a trustworthy process. To ensure the reliability of the collected data we recorded the oral 
interviews on tape. This recording was done to ensure the possibility of re-interpretation and 
reproducibility of our interviews. Only one informant objected to this recording. This particular 
interview was supported by follow up questions and we could contact the informant later if 
required. In addition, we made detailed notes on all interviews. The interview guide included 
some questions we knew the answers to, as recommended by Andersen (2006) to control the 
reliability of the answers.  
 
To ensure reliability, the information gathered in the interviews needs to be analyzed correctly. 
We were always two persons attending the interview, to ensure we understood the interview 
objects. Being two interviewers made it easier to ask follow up and clarifying questions. After 
the interview, we discussed the interview and analyzed the collected data. This discussion was 
helpful in interpreting the interview objects statements and in discussing the different 
understandings. One challenge mentioned by Andersen (2006) is that informants can, after a 
period, forget aspects, remember the conversation differently, or change opinions. This fast 
discussion made it easier to contact the informants soon after the interviews, hence to minimize 
the possibility of the informants changing their view.  
 
Some interviews were conducted with two interview objects present. This approach can restrict 
the openness around the interview and the objects can involuntarily hold back important 
statements. However, this approach ensures that the information received is more reliable since 
two interview objects can jointly confirm the information. Whenever two interview objects 
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were present they were of the same level but with different roles. In other words, they did not 
possess the same knowledge, and we ensured that neither of them were at a higher authority 
than the other. 
 
A central question concerning reliability is whether someone else would come to the same 
conclusions by using the same methodology and design. Thagaard (1998) states that this is 
hardly relevant for a qualitative study, since the relationship between the interview object and 
interviewer will be different based on the person performing the interview. The information the 
informants provided will not necessary be analyzed and interpreted in the same way by others. 
However, we used a variety of data collection methods in order to confirm our results. We 
therefore believe other would have reached similar conclusions by using this variety of 
approaches. 
 
The reliability of the information is reduced by the Ugandan culture of not criticizing their 
superiors. The informants we spoke to are specialists in their fields and have high positions in 
both the government and petroleum companies. However, as we are from the country of the 
OfD program the interview objects will probably be above average positive to the program and 
the achievements. We experienced that the more involved the informants were to the 
cooperation, the more positive they were to the technology transfer. These informants have of 
course more knowledge about the program, however, there is considerable funding involved, 
and the reliability of certain statements can therefore be questioned. We have excluded these 
informants view of the OfD program in further analysis, as these views are not considered 
reliable.  
 
Different interview objects treated us differently. During the interview process with the 
Ugandan Government and the petroleum companies, we noticed that they carefully thought 
through and were more cautious of the answers they gave. The petroleum workers in the 
oilfields had very limited restrictions towards us. We believe this relates to the setting of the 
interviews and talks. The observation might have seemed more informal than an organized 
interview, and the positions they held. Overall, our experience was that being two female 
students was advantageous in relation to interviews and observations. We were not considered 
a threat to the system and experienced the interview objects to be open, cooperative and honest. 
This experience adds to the credibility of the reliability of the data. 
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The validity of the data concerns whether the findings represent the actual reality (Thagaard, 
1998). Validity can be divided into internal and external validity. The external validity is 
discussed in 4.6.1 as transferability of the findings.  
 
To ensure that the collected data is relevant and valid for the study, and to consider uncertainties 
such as underlying conditions, we have carefully selected the literature, interview objects, 
observation and social media. We ensured that the literature and theory are relevant to the 
research problems prior to moving into the interview stage. The validity of the research is 
increased as the results we have found are supported by theory. The interview objects are 
selected based on their position, knowledge and relevance to the cooperation between Uganda 
and Norway. All interview objects have exceptional knowledge of the Ugandan risk governance 
system and/or the OfD program. Without this knowledge the validity of the interview objects 
will be impaired (Blaikie, 2010). We selected interview objects from most aspects of the OfD 
program to ensure a balanced view. These choices enabled us to confirm the trustworthiness in 
the information received and contributed to support both the reliability and validity of our 
conclusions.  
 
Observations at the exploration sites, of risk governance in practice gave a major advantage to 
our study. The observation enabled us to crosscheck the information given by the interview 
objects. We also reviewed social media pages on Facebook to broaden the data foundation and 
obtain a greater understanding of the opinions of society around the petroleum industry. In 
addition, other evaluations of the OfD program in Uganda, have come to similar conclusions 
as us. If the findings from different time periods are the same, this increases the internal validity 
(Thagaard, 1998). Examples of these evaluations are ILPI (2013) and Norad (2012).  
 
The order of the data gathering has not been accidental. The interview guide was based on the 
literature review. The observation was performed after the interviews, to ensure the information 
gathered from the interviews were valid. This gave an opportunity to check the validity of 
previous findings.  
 
4.6.1 Transferability 
External validity entails the questioning of the transferability of the conclusions. The current 
study aims at identifying parameters that hamper and/or promote transfer of technological 
systems. Whether these parameters also are relevant in cooperation between other actors remain 
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to be demonstrated. Blaikie (2010) emphasizes the challenges related to transferability of a 
qualitative study, particularly a case study. The reason is that it is difficult to reproduce exactly 
the same conditions; the interviewer, its interpretations, the research object, and the point in 
time.  
 
We use the OfD program in Uganda as a case, and we study this case the first six month of 
2014, in the very last phase of the project. The choice of data collection, the timing, as well as 
the social construction around the program must be taken into account. Therefore, the 
transferability of the conclusions will not be without difficulties. In spite of this, we believe that 
many of the conclusions have bearing in technology transfer from Norway to developing 
countries also in other industrial settings. 
 
Scharffscher (2010) presents a view on transferability of a case study, in terms of dividing the 
context of study into an inner- and outer-context. The outer context is the Ugandan risk 
governance system, which is the context where the actors perform their activities. The inner-
context is the structure, standards, guidelines, statuses and responsibilities internally in relation 
to the cooperation between Norway and Uganda (Scharffscher, 2010). According to this view, 
the inner-context is transferable. Some of the elements, structures and situations created through 
the OfD program may be similar in a different setting. For example, another African country 
creating a petroleum industry will most likely have problems in terms of lack of human 
resources and weak institutions. The absence of unions and corruption challenges are common 
in developing countries. However, the specific problems met at the oil sites are not 
transferrable.  
 
In other words, standardize the way these situations are dealt with can be done, to a certain 
extent, through procedures, guidelines and challenges. In this study we found that the 
parameters of interplay and characteristics among the involved actors, time and preconditions 
in the system are seen as promoting and/or hampering the technology transfer and can be 
viewed as relevant to other similar transfer processes. In addition, involved actors, systems and 
the structure they create will largely be similar. In all contexts it will be a cooperation between 
the governments of the “receiving” country and the “sender” country, like the cooperation 
between NPSA, NPD, MEMD and PEPD. The way the cooperation has been constructed can 
therefore be transferred to another country, in terms of internal guidelines and positions. 
However, the outer-context is not transferable as the settings in the Ugandan risk governance 
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system is remarkably different to other contexts with cultural and country specific elements. 
The specific problems met will not be the same in another risk governance system. This idea 
indicates that the inner-context, being the procedures, guidelines and challenges found in the 
OfD cooperation between Norway and Uganda, is transferable and will only involve minor 
variations between different local contexts. 
 
4.7 Strength and weaknesses with our design  
 
Our study requires us to enter into a broad and complex topic, which is well documented, and 
frequently discussed.  
 
The OfD program is not completed, but we believe now is a suitable time to analyze technology 
transfer performed in this program. Since start-up in 2009, the Ugandan Petroleum Sector has 
gone through great changes. The program is in its last year and Uganda is moving towards 
production start. We see this as a favorable stage to study the cooperation and analyze the 
aspects hampering and promoting the transfer. Following, all actors of the project are still 
present and involved in the cooperation. This means that information focused on the transfer is 
not disturbed or forgotten.  
 
However, great changes takes time and is difficult to measure. The fact that the production has 
not started yet complicates this. Nevertheless, as this study want to measure the focus in the 
transfer process, together with the present capacity and trust in the risk governance system, we 
find the timing appropriate.  
 
It is challenging to measure changes that occur due to the technology transfer, and to distinguish 
these from changes that result from natural variations in a dynamic, growing petroleum 
industry. Uganda is a developing country and there might be other reasons than the OfD 
cooperation for the changes appearing. As explained by the iceberg theory presented in the 
previous chapter, not all elements are easy to transfer and some are transferred “invisibly”, 
which makes these understandings a complex task. Hidden conditions like these may also 
appear in relation to our research questions. Particularly research question two and three, which 
considers capacity and trust in the Ugandan risk governance system. They represent 
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characteristics in the risk governance system, which is diffuse and depends on the person being 
interviewed as trust and capacity can be understood differently. 
 
There are two major challenges inherent in our chosen data analysis approach. Firstly, by using 
existing theory we may get a predetermined opinion towards a certain outcome and this can 
blind us from the contextual aspect. Secondly, during the interviews some of the interview 
objects may tend to give us the answers we prefer and not their own point of view. However, 
by having these challenges in mind, there is a greater chance to avoid the pitfalls. Discussions 
between the two of us also kept us alert to overcome these challenges. 
 
 
  
  
49 
 
5. Presentation of results 
 
This chapter presents the empirical data. The chapter is divided into three sub chapters in line 
with the research questions. The first sub chapter presents findings with focus on transfer of 
risk governance systems. Further, the second and third subchapters contain findings 
concerning presence of capacity and presence of trust in the Ugandan risk governance system. 
 
5.1 Research question 1 
What is the focus within the transfer of Norwegian risk governance systems to Uganda? 
 
The following list indicates what is needed and important to consider when transferring risk 
governance systems: decontextualization, different roles and responsibilities in the cooperation, 
transfer of capacity, and time prioritization and efficiency.  
 
5.1.1 Decontextualization and Norway 
The transfer is not a blueprint of the Norwegian risk governance system and this is strongly 
emphasized, and focused on from all informants. Still, the cooperation has contributed to 
implement certain elements from the Norwegian risk governance system to Uganda.  
 
“Technology cannot be directly transferred” (NPSA). NPSA explained that their focus during 
the transfer process is on decontextualization of certain ideas, hence to identify and remove 
conditions dependent on the Norwegian environment. For example, the tripartite collaboration 
is decontextualized to stakeholder management. In Uganda, this stakeholder management 
consists of the government and the petroleum companies only.  
 
The focus on using Norway as a role model and their assistance in developing the industry in 
Uganda is debated. The NGO is critical to the success of transferring technological system 
between Norway and Uganda. “The OfD cooperation will not work because of the huge 
differences between Norway and Uganda” (NGO). They argue that Uganda will obtain greater 
benefits from cooperating with a country more similar to Uganda. Norway has a completely 
different foundation in terms of trust and capacity, they argue. Accordingly the risk assessment 
performed by ILPI (2013) concluded that there are risks involved with using Norway as 
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cooperative country. They do not know the Ugandan situation and this can lead to a number of 
unfamiliar risks. 
 
 This topic is also discussed on the Facebook page of Oil in Uganda.  
 
 
 
 
The claim is that using the model of Ghana will be better than the Norwegian model. Ghana is 
seen as more comparable due to proximity in both culture and geography. However, the 
majority accepted Norway as a better role model in terms of avoidance of the resource curse 
and training. The Governor of the Bank of Uganda stated “We must be Africa’s Norway. We 
must manage our oil resources in the stellar manner in which Botswana has managed its wealth 
from diamonds” (Wass & Musiime, 2013). 
 
5.1.2 Roles and responsibilities in the cooperation   
There is a focus on clarity in roles within the cooperation. The Norwegian actors are found to 
operate as advisors in the cooperation while Ugandan actors sit in the driver seat. The latters 
are the decisive and responsible party, as they know the local context best. “I’m not a public 
officer in Uganda, therefore, I cannot take responsibility for the decisions that are made in 
Uganda” (OfD resident coordinator). Ugandan actors are the recipients, and therefore 
responsible for selecting and implementing the new technology.  
 
Norwegian actors contribute with their expertise during visits to Uganda, or while Ugandans 
visit Norway. “We do not implement Norwegian processes. We give advice on how things can 
Figure 10: Screenshot from Oil In Uganda Facebook page 23.05.2014 (Oil In 
Uganda, 2014b) 
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or cannot be done” (OfD resident coordinator). Both petroleum related laws passed in Uganda 
the last two years, were developed with contribution from the Norwegian Government and 
consultants. The laws are functional based and share the characteristics of the Norwegian 
petroleum law. 
 
Through interviews, it is highlighted that the motivation regarding technology transfer needs to 
come from Uganda. Ugandan actors needs to require assistance and must be involved in the 
entire process. They must not blindly follow the assistance and advises of Norwegians. This 
motivation is exemplified by the current supervision strategy in the Ugandan risk governance 
system. The Ugandan Government is currently using a 24/7 monitoring approach during 
operations in the fields. There is a disagreement between Norwegian and Ugandan actors 
whether this is a wise choice.  
 
The claim is that the petroleum companies will not report on issues to the government if they 
can avoid it. The Norwegian actors question the motivation and efficiency of the 24/7 
monitoring. Note also that governmental representatives performing the monitoring receive a 
substantial higher wage than while performing their other daily tasks. From the Norwegian side, 
this is considered a sensitive topic to discuss with the Ugandan Government. Related to this 
challenge, it was stated, “you have to choose your own battles” (NPSA). 
 
Despite the diverse opinions on supervision, one of the focus areas for 2014 is to test a known 
system audit. This is an approach widely used in Norway and it is based on trust and learning, 
rather than strict monitoring. The known audit approach will be tested on a small part of the 
operations. The plan is that this audit will be performed in line with how NPSA practice known 
audits. Related to this it was stated, “it is crucial that this is a small and successful audit” 
(NPSA).  
 
5.1.3 Capacity as a foundation 
A central focus of the cooperation between Norway and Uganda is on capacity building. The 
objective is to organize institutional arrangements and capacities to ensure a well coordinated 
and results oriented risk governance system. To accomplish this objective, focus is on 
assistance, in developing strategies and structures that aims at improving capacity. All actors in 
the OfD cooperation acknowledge the need for competence, skills and strong institutions as a 
foundation for technology transfer. Capacity building is therefore the first step in the process.  
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“We need to roll out that plan and make sure the resources are in place in terms of people. Both 
on our side and the Norwegian side” (PEPD). There is a great competence focus in technology 
transfer. Competence is considered a requirement, both from Ugandan and Norwegian actors, 
since both parties must communicate through a similar language. Ugandans must have the 
capacity to choose and implement the technology they find suitable in their local context.  
 
The competence as a prerequisite for transfer has been achieved through education, work 
experience and networking through international conferences. Education is essential and 
informants emphasized that many employees in the Ugandan Government hold university 
degrees from recognized international universities. Work experience is an efficient and 
essential way to gain experience and competence, but it appears to be an area lacking sufficient 
focus. It was claimed that the employees of the government use too few hours at the office 
performing their work, while they spend the majority of their time out on conferences and 
courses. These courses and conferences are important learning platforms for the employees, but 
without actual work experience and hands on work, the knowledge will not benefit the industry. 
Many conferences involve per diem payments and are held at exciting locations. Following 
this, the motivations for conference participation are questioned. 
 
Support in establishing regulations and strategies are time consuming. “We will also now need 
auditing framework and learn how to audit. We do not have these documents in place. But 
going forward we expect maybe by the end of this program we should have had those three 
critical elements; the supervisor framework, the regulations for HSE and we should be having 
a tool for supervisory and monitoring HSE” (PEPD). Not all processes are initiated yet, as 
things take time, particularly regarding approvals from the Ugandan Government.  
 
Transfer knowledge about structures in the government and risk governance system as a whole 
is important. PEPD is working on implementing a new structure within their department. This 
structure divides the department into three divisions; a National Oil Company (NOC), a 
Petroleum Authority (PA) and a Petroleum Directorate (PD). The division of roles is inspired 
by the Norwegian structure of governmental departments. PEPD believes this is a suitable 
structure for the division of roles, and it increases the requirement for more internal specialized 
skills. The petroleum companies believe the division of roles is important and are primarily 
positive due to the founding of NOC. They expect NOC to bridge the gap between the 
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government and the petroleum companies. At the moment, the government is very critical to 
expenses and operations of the petroleum companies. By establishing NOC they will experience 
the costs related to operations and HSE procedures. Hopefully, these changes will make the 
cooperation between the government and petroleum companies smoother in the long run. 
 
5.1.4 Time prioritization and efficiency 
Time and efficiency are seen as necessary focus areas in the transfer process. Ugandan actors 
object to open for petroleum production before the required competence, legislation, strategies, 
and structures are in place. The process to ensure that the prerequisites for a successful transfer 
are in place is time consuming. The focus on time is seen as positive from a majority of the 
informants.  
 
The Ugandan petroleum industry accepts the time needed to establish the industry. It is time 
consuming to gain knowledge, hire competent people, develop strategies and include serious 
actors, as well as strengthen the regulations. Time has been prioritized before production and 
earning money quickly from the industry. This focus has resulted in production being planned 
in 2018.  
 
Time prioritization and “African time” were also mentioned as a challenge. “They don’t 
understand that sometimes in the oil and gas industry you have to make the changes quick. The 
whole process of writing the letter, writing the project brief, them coming to site to see that 
everything is alright, you know, time is up, and your loosing so much money if the rig is going 
to wait” (Petroleum company).  
 
The process has, to some extent, been slower than necessary. Related to this, it was stated “how 
slow can slow be?” (Petroleum company). It took five years to pass the new Petroleum Law. 
The bureaucratic decision process was extremely time consuming. “Now, we are on the seventh 
year and we haven’t produced anything yet. We still have to build a refinery. We still have to 
build a pipeline, we haven’t even yet got a field development plan approved. So the time is a 
challenge for the petroleum companies” (Petroleum Company). 
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5.2 Research question 2 
What impact has the present capacity in the Ugandan risk governance system on the 
implementation of new technology? 
 
Certain characteristics are identified in the Ugandan risk governance system that has an impact 
on the capacity of the system. These are listed in Table 4. These topics will be further discussed 
in the sub-sections; available knowledge, lack of focus on safety, interactions in the system and 
cooperation. 
 
Capacity characteristics of the Ugandan risk governance system 
Bipartite collaboration as stakeholder management between government and 
petroleum companies 
High competence and legitimacy in stakeholder management 
Formal meetings in stakeholder management to share knowledge and discuss strategies 
Lack of understanding of the impact of the work 
Diverse risk perceptions between stakeholder management and other stakeholders in 
the system 
Knowledge not completely utilized due to organizational arrangement and 
environment 
Relaxed attitude 
Strict hierarchy results in lack of creativity and team orientation 
Table 4: Characteristics concerning capacity in the Ugandan risk governance system 
 
5.2.1 Available knowledge   
“PEPD is one of the best governmental departments in Africa regarding capacity” (OfD 
resident coordinator). All informants perceive PEPD and NEMA as competent regulators with 
high legitimacy. They appear to be a pilot for other departments in the Ugandan Government 
and they are considered capable of challenging the petroleum companies’ strategies. 
Environmental risks are considered important and it was stated that officers in NEMA are 
“better than the pope on environmental challenges” (NPSA).  
 
“The key risks facing the resource pillar relates to how best to support the finalization and 
implementation of new legislation, and the transition to new institutional arrangements” (ILPI, 
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2013). Some informants are questioning whether the government understands the new 
technologies implemented and the consequences this can have. It is mentioned that Uganda has 
developed good laws, in line with international standards. However, the challenge is the ability 
of the system to capture the information, implement the laws and apply it to the Ugandan 
situation. At the Annual OfD meeting in Kampala this year, it was stated that “further assistance 
on regulations and implementation of the law is still required, especially on aspects of technical 
capacity and transition to new institutional arrangement that is required to support the required 
planning” (MEMD, 2014) 
 
The NGO referred to the experience with an environmental impact assessment report by the 
government. This report was supposed to provide the base for some major environmental 
decisions. However, the decisions were made before the report was completed, and the report 
ended up supporting the decision already made. This decision process question the legitimacy 
of the report and the governments understanding of the issues and importance of the 
consequences. 
 
“They do not use their knowledge actively. Motivation is more on problems than problem 
solving” (Norwegian actor). The challenges, particularly at government level, are related to 
practical implementation of the knowledge. Informants expressed that the motivation in the 
Ugandan risk governance system embraces an attitude that "it will all be all right". In addition, 
the stakeholders are familiar with non-stable conditions, and expect major changes to occur in 
daily life and in society. They deal with changes as they occur in an unstable environment and 
do not actively seek stable solutions to the problems up front.  
 
Available knowledge and capacity to implement new technology is a relevant and frequently 
discussed topic in Uganda. Oil in Uganda initiated a discussion regarding capacity on their 
Facebook page, see Figure 11. 
Figure 11: Screenshot from Oil In Uganda's Facebook page 19.05.2014 (Oil In Uganda, 
2014b) 
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The majority of the responses focused on training to gain knowledge and be able to meet 
requirements to handle a petroleum industry. However, it was argued, “training is key, but it is 
useless without the industry experience, which Ugandans may not get until after about 20 
years” (Facebook respondent (Oil In Uganda, 2014b)). 
 
5.2.2 Lack of focus on safety 
“The focus on safety is extremely low in Uganda, at least in general” (OfD resident 
coordinator). The majority of the informants involved in the OfD program brought up the 
general lack of focus on safety in the country. “HSE risk perception in Uganda is a challenge. 
Very few are certified by international or independent regulators in their field” (PEPD). 
Informants in the industry confirmed PEPD’s statement. They considered this a challenge 
particularly since the new petroleum law requires petroleum companies to hire national 
contractors and employees. 
 
Related to this, Oil in Uganda posed an article in December 2013 in their newsletter regarding 
Ugandan sub-contractors dumping waste outside a local community instead of at the designated 
area (SSkika, 2013). This issue is difficult for the petroleum companies since they are 
responsible for their sub-contractors. It exists only a few approved local sub-contractors to 
choose from and petroleum companies do not believe the knowledge, safety focus and capacity 
of these sub-contractors to be appropriate for participation in production. 
 
NGOs, unions, media and local contractors have a more narrow emphasis towards risks than 
the petroleum companies and the government. This is illustrated through a media example told 
by the OfD resident coordinator: If a petroleum company dumps waste in the national park, 
there is a lot of commotion and front page news. But when a worker fell down from a 
government building site and died, nothing was reported and the work continued as soon as the 
dead body was removed from the site. This example exposes the media focus in Uganda and 
the difference in focus on two serious incidents.  
 
5.2.3 Interactions in the system   
There is a hierarchical structure in the Ugandan risk governance system, particularly at an 
organizational level within the government. Findings demonstrate that this structure challenge 
the capacity to implement new technology due to lack of creativity and team orientation. The 
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OfD resident coordinator claimed that their knowledge is not fully utilized due to the hierarchy 
and the structure of the organizations. In the Ugandan culture the authorities are not challenged 
by ideas from lower level employees. The lower level employees are used to receiving 
instructions of what to do. They seldom use common sense based on their own experiences and 
act accordingly.  
 
The lack of team orientation is observed through a tendency of hiding information, even 
internally within organizations. “They keep everything secret, and say they don’t want to, or 
can share it. And when I ask why, the answer is: I just can’t do it. This is a challenge” 
(Norwegian actor). However, there are different points of views. The government claims that 
cooperation internally is smooth and that they do not see this as a problem or challenge. 
 
Openness is crucial for actors in the petroleum industry, not just internally within the 
government. The OfD resident coordinator supports this view. “One of the key points in the 
OfD program is transparency, there has to be an openness. It is very little of this, there is no 
culture for it” (OfD resident coordinator). 
 
5.2.4 Cooperation  
There are organized meetings and formal interactions between the government and petroleum 
companies in Uganda. The aim is to achieve mutual understanding and a dialogue in the 
development of strategies between the stakeholders. Related to this, it was pointed out that 
Uganda has motivated stakeholders with respect to change and improvement of the risk 
governance system.  
 
The unions, NGOs and sub-contractors are not included in the stakeholder management. Their 
competence and perceptions are therefore not part of the system. These groups are not 
considered to be competent enough and to be too small compared to the two stakeholders. “The 
communication with unions and NGOs is on a very limited scale. But there are so many NGOs 
that are operating in the area and there are so many that anything they create will have oil and 
gas in it” (Petroleum company). 
 
“Unions? No we don’t have the culture of unions here, not yet in oil and gas” (Petroleum 
company). The unions are not a traditional part of the Ugandan society and only one informant 
could mention a workers union in the petroleum industry. The petroleum related union has two 
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employees, no computer, no transport vehicle and have difficulties obtaining funding and 
memberships. The unions are many levels below the petroleum companies and the government 
in terms of knowledge, financial position or influential perspective. Still, both NGOs and the 
workers union want to be included since they see the benefit of a third party. “At least one 
independent third party is necessary to ensure transparency and balance in this industry” 
(NGO). 
 
“I think we have a good relationship. We haven’t been bogged down negatively by the NGOs 
so far” (Petroleum company). There exists a large number of NGOs in Uganda, most of them 
are small and with specialized focus. Following, the NGOs knowledge and focus is at civil 
society and environmental challenges, none of them at safety or security. The NGOs cannot 
measure up to the level of capacity of the petroleum companies and the government.  
 
5.3 Research question 3 
In what way is trust present in the Ugandan risk governance system? 
 
“There is a high degree of trust in Norway. This doesn’t exist here in Uganda” (OfD resident 
coordinator). Table 5 lists mechanisms in the Ugandan risk governance system that indicates 
that trust is present between the stakeholders in the Ugandan risk governance system. In 
addition, the right column lists choices that are made within the Ugandan risk governance 
system and that indicate trust. In the following sub-sections we discuss: need for control, 
corruption, competence vs. attitude, and building trust. 
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Presence of trust depending 
attributes 
Choices made affecting trust and distrust 
Trust in competence and skills  
 
 - Implementation of functional based regulations 
 - Creation of forums and quarterly formal meetings 
 - Time prioritizing development of capacity 
 - Changing the structure within PEPD 
 - 24/7 field monitoring approach 
Serious stakeholders 
Willingness between stakeholders 
Secrecy internally and externally 
Lack of motivation and capacity 
in contractors 
Different values internally and 
externally 
Lack of reliability in the system 
Table 5: Trust findings 
 
5.3.1 Need for control 
All three petroleum companies and the Ugandan Government stated they trust each other. 
However, the findings prove different. During drilling, PEPD is enforcing the 24/7 monitoring 
approach explained above. The major reason for using this monitoring approach is that the 
government believes that the petroleum companies will refrain from reporting errors if they can 
avoid it. Consequently, the petroleum companies do not experience trust from the government 
due to constant monitoring. However, the monitoring approach was also seen as an advantage 
by one of the petroleum companies. Both PEPD and NEMA has monitoring that would be based 
in the field so that on a day-to-day level for the operational changes there is possible to deal 
with them on a field level (Petroleum company). This is favorable as operational changes appear 
and is one way to avoid frustrations related to “African time”.  
 
5.3.2 Corruption 
Corruption is a recognized problem in Uganda, and this complicates a relationship based on 
trust. Production of petroleum has not yet started for the Ugandan petroleum industry, so the 
industry’s impact on corruption remains to be seen. ILPI (2013) risk assessment describes the 
corruption in the Ugandan risk governance system and predicts that it will influence the 
robustness of the system.  
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The corruption occurs at several levels in the system; street level police, government, petroleum 
companies and contractors. “The police at street level are corrupt which makes it difficult for 
the supervisor to coordinate with them” (Norwegian actor).  In addition, the reason for freezing 
the OfD program support for the first eight months of 2013, was corruption at the President’s 
office. Following, no initiatives are taken to comply with the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative principles, which Norwegian actors strongly recommend. This 
initiative contains international measures to enable governments to identify secretive 
management and preserve transparency. 
 
During interviews, suspicion about the information provided by the government was expressed. 
Secret information is passed on to certain actors through personal contacts. This is particularly 
related to the association that organizes local contractors and suppliers. Sons and relatives of 
influential governmental employees mainly run these companies, and they receive privileged 
information and can therefore easily win tenders and contracts. 
 
In addition, if the petroleum companies meet challenges with PEPD, they would try to take the 
conflict to a higher level within the government and try to override PEPD. “Trust will first come 
when the petroleum industry sees that the government actually comes with reasonable 
suggestions. The petroleum companies need to have an expression that the government don’t 
reject an application or a request just to reject it. But actually have an explanation for the 
rejection or approval” (OfD resident coordinator).  
 
5.3.3 Competence vs. attitude 
The stakeholders trust the other actors’ competence and ability to perform the work, and 
participants in the stakeholder management trust that the other parties have the capacity to 
perform their duties. All the petroleum companies mentioned that PEPD has strengthened its 
capacity, through high competence and skills. In addition, the three present petroleum 
companies are seen as serious actors and several informants expressed confidence in them to 
perform safe operations.  
 
It appears that the local industry is suspicious of the attitude of the petroleum companies. It is 
widely believed that the petroleum companies will surpass the laws, since they are confident 
that the Ugandan Government will not impose sanctions in the same manner as other industrial 
countries. The Ugandan Government is too dependent on the petroleum production to do so. 
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The petroleum companies claim they live up to international standards. However, both 
Norwegian actors and PEPD claimed differences in action between operations in Norway and 
operations in Uganda are observed. 
     
5.3.4 Building trust 
Petroleum companies and the government both consider their relationship as positive with close 
communication and clarity of roles and responsibilities. “They (the government) have worked 
hard to get to the point to where they are now, the process of how to gain trust and respect has 
been long” (Petroleum company). The petroleum companies believe focus on capacity building 
and strengthening structures will improve the trust in the stakeholder management. As 
presented above, establishment of the NOC will help remove the distrust and build confidence 
between the petroleum companies and the government, since the government will learn to better 
understand the petroleum business. 
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6. Analysis 
 
To answer the research questions, our results presented in the previous chapter are further 
discussed with the theory. The research questions are analyzed in separate sections. The first 
part covers the focus within the transfer of Norwegian risk governance system to Uganda. 
Furthermore, capacity and trust, as central prerequisites in the Norwegian risk governance 
system, are discussed. We consider how capacity is present in the Ugandan risk governance 
system and how this impact implementation of new technology. Lastly, we discuss the presence 
of trust in the Ugandan risk governance system.  
 
6.1 Research question 1 
What is the focus within the transfer of Norwegian risk governance systems to Uganda? 
 
First, the focus on transferring only certain elements and no blueprint is discussed. Further, the 
discussion considers choice of cooperating country and the actors’ roles. Lastly, the focus on 
capacity as a foundation and time prioritization will be analyzed.  
 
6.1.1 No blueprint: a requirement as well as a challenge 
It is clear that the Ugandan risk governance system is not set up as a blueprint of the Norwegian 
risk governance system. Since the system is complex and strongly integrated into the 
Norwegian system, it would not be possible to fully adapt it into a new context (Røvik, 2007). 
As referred to by Aven and Renn (2010), a technological system is strongly integrated within 
its social construction such as the stakeholders, organizational arrangements and the 
relationship of this interplay. Transfer of a complete technological system, is therefore a 
complex, and a near impossible task. 
 
Focus on implementation of only a few technologies can have its advantages. When selecting 
certain technologies to implement, it is easier to contextualize them into the new system. It is 
required that the technologies are constantly adapted to the changing environment, regulatory 
framework and organizational requirements (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). Thereby, to succeed in 
the transfer, it is necessary to implement only a few technologies to ensure they are accepted in 
the changing environment. 
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“No blueprint” is an important focus in all interviews, both from a “sender” and “receiver” 
point of view. As found, the decontextualization is an attempt to transfer a system out of its 
own local context. However, what happens to the system in the receiving country when only 
certain technologies are decontextualized and transferred into such a complex arrangement? In 
line with Hughes (1987) definition of a technological system, the combination of these 
technologies will be the sum that makes up the system. This means that there are other strength 
and weaknesses in the system when only some technologies are adapted from the Norwegian 
risk governance system. Thus, a new technological system is created.  
 
One example is the functional dependence in the technologies in the Norwegian risk governance 
system on all the three stakeholders in the tripartite system. Following Cohen (2004), all 
elements are required simultaneously to achieve a successful technology transfer. Since there 
are no operative unions in the Ugandan risk governance system, the tripartite collaboration as 
in Norway, is impossible. Thus, the composition of the elements has a different relevance, new 
risk picture, with other strength and weaknesses in the new context. Accordingly, the 
stakeholder management cannot be seen as a technology adapted from the Norwegian risk 
governance system, rather a new technology. 
 
Even though there is focus on “no blueprint” of the Norwegian risk governance system, the 
underlying motives for the decontextualization is implicit a blueprint. Given that the elements 
adapted are identical to the elements in the Norwegian risk governance system, these specific 
elements can be considered as blueprints.  
 
As Olsen (1996) states, each actor has an understanding, and is defined according to their 
inclusion in a common technological frame. This statement highlights the idea that Norwegian 
actors have experience from the Norwegian risk governance system. Following, the relation of 
Norwegian actors to systems and technologies are influenced by these experiences. From this 
perspective, a blueprint of elements comes natural since this is the experience of the Norwegian 
actors. Thereby, the transfer is a decontextualization of the Norwegian risk governance system, 
rather than a new system.  
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6.1.2 Choice of cooperating country 
A clear focus from all informants is that the process needs to be initiated by the Ugandan 
Government. In accordance with the theoretical description of care-why, changes cannot be 
implemented successfully without the motivation from Uganda. It is necessary that they act as 
the driving force. Thus, the Ugandan actors’ motivation affects the choice of activities, effort 
and persistence regarding learning (Asbjørnsen et al., 1999).  
 
It is recognized that there is a difference between Norway and Uganda regarding infrastructure, 
organizational structure and presence of good governance. The majority of the informants 
brought up these differences as hampering the implementation of technologies. As Garud 
(1997) argues, technology is often deeply integrated, embedded know-how may be difficult to 
identify and change. Following the theory, different understandings is a result of different 
experiences and information. Norwegian actors contributes in the cooperation with their 
understandings, based on previous experiences (Gilje & Grimen, 1993). These experiences are 
from operations in a self-regulative risk governance system. Thereby, the Norwegian actors 
have an in-depth understanding of the benefits this strategy provides. However, the 
understandings of strengths and weaknesses if selecting a risk governance system built on a 
different approach, for example command-and-control, will not be as clear. In effect, it is more 
natural for the Ugandan Government to select and adapt elements similar to the Norwegian risk 
governance system, being the cooperative country. Thus, the decision is not based on a 
complete overview over of all alternatives.  
 
Furthermore, the risk governance system in the United States is based on close monitoring and 
control strategies. This system is also perceived as a robust, well-operating system, with a very 
different structure than the Norwegian risk governance system. Recognizing that there is no 
statistical evidence for which system works best, the choice of country to cooperate with will 
automatically define an essential part of the transfer and focus (Engen, 2014).  
 
It follows from our findings that the Ugandan risk governance system has a hierarchal structure 
within the organizations. The system is recognized by lack of team orientation, a need to control 
and secrecy. According to Engen (2014) the choices of regulatory approach is dependent on the 
political culture.  Hence, Norway, with a self-regulative approach, may not be the most 
appropriate country for Uganda to cooperate with. When the prerequisites differ as much as 
they do between Norway and Uganda, these dependent conditions may complicate the adaption 
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process. Consequently, the major differences create possibilities of tacit knowledge due to 
different understandings. Thus, this may put the focus towards the wrong role model. 
 
Following the theory, a country more similar to Uganda may have more equal conditions and 
challenges. Hence, a system that will be easier to implement. Considering the discussion on the 
Oil in Uganda website, Ghana’s risk governance system appears to have many of the same 
challenges and prerequisites as Uganda. From this view, it may be more appropriate for Uganda 
to cooperate with Ghana.   
 
Given that every system is highly integrated into their local context (Lindøe et al., 2014), it may 
not matter whether Norway, the United States or Ghana is the partner, despite the great 
differences. The Ugandan actors make the choice of whom they want to cooperate with to obtain 
a robust risk governance system. This decision has an impact on the development of the system. 
 
Following this assumption, even for systems with similar prerequisites, there are always many 
hidden aspects of the iceberg, under the water level. Uganda can never receive the whole 
“technology package” (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). The focus on achieving a wider understanding 
of the system, and its strength and weakness when implementing it into a new context, will 
always be important. This focus is more important than the similarities of the systems. Thus, 
the key knowledge when transferring technologies is the understanding of the benefits and 
challenges of the system, the aim with the system, and which adaptions that is required. Hence, 
the motivation of the Ugandan actors and the choice of cooperative country will be of utmost 
importance for the development of their risk governance system.  
 
6.1.3 Focus on capacity 
There has been a focus on increasing the capacity in Uganda in order to implement and maintain 
a risk governance system in two ways. Firstly, to increase the knowledge level for governmental 
employees. Secondly, to ensure that the strategies and structures of government departments 
are adequate. This is in line with the definition of Aven and Renn’s (2010). These two measures 
are discussed below. 
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Learning 
In theory, learning is important for the transfer of risk governance systems from Norway to 
Uganda. Learning is not an element that is transferred, it is developed throughout the process. 
However, learning is critical in the transfer process. The learning aspect is established and 
contributes to a greater understanding of the technologies and its adaptability.  
 
Technologies will gradually improve as the actors gain more knowledge and experience (Olsen 
& Lindøe, 2009). This is emphasized through the iceberg model were learning contributes to 
reduce the likelihood of omitting tacit knowledge. Therefore, preparations for learning through 
different activities contribute to increased understanding of the whole risk governance system.  
 
The strategy for increased knowledge is consistent with Olsen and Lindøe (2009) who 
emphasizes that knowledge is perceived through education, experience and values in the 
environment. Correspondingly, this focus is in line with Beer et al. (1990b), which outlines how 
learning has a positive effect on the implementation of a system. This was also mentioned 
during discussions on Oil in Uganda’s Facebook page whether Uganda has the relevant capacity 
to handle a growing petroleum industry.  
 
Learning is a complex process related to transfer of technologies, since obtaining a complete 
understanding is a perpetual process. Particularly the elements under the surface in the iceberg 
model are difficult to learn and understand. The experience is, however, that the actors involved 
in the transfer process are managing these uncertainties. Firstly, “sender” and “receiver” has 
both visited each other countries for a longer period and experienced the systems and 
environments. Secondly, there is a permanent presence of Norwegian actors in Uganda, 
supporting the practice of new technologies in the local context. Lastly, the focus on having a 
Norwegian actor located in Uganda reduces the misunderstandings and tacit knowledge. The 
“sender” has a greater understanding of their local context, in addition to experience from the 
host local context. Following Olsen and Lindøe (2009), learning happens in an environment 
and through interaction with other people. Thereby, a focus on learning contributes to greater 
understandings.  
 
However, these skills are gained through years of experience, and the skills will never be 
completely transferred. Even though the Ugandan Government prioritizes considerable amount 
of time to strengthen the capacity in the system, the production is not yet commenced. The 
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important work experience will not be gained until after production start. As Garud (1997) 
emphasizes, know-why must be obtained through learning and experience, by being in the 
working environment. This is required to understand the principles and theories underlying the 
functioning of the technological system. Garud (1997) thereby confirms the importance of work 
experience, which can not be obtained until after production start.  
 
Structure 
Another important aspect regarding the focus on capacity building is the orgware of the 
technology. Following Olsen and Lindøe (2009), when changes appear in one or more of the 
technological elements, other elements must be adjusted accordingly. This entails that the 
structure around the elements must be in place to support the elements and to ensure the 
sustainability of the changes. The new structure in PEPD is a replicate of the Norwegian 
structure with the departments responsible for the petroleum industry being divided in three. 
This structure increase the capacity of the Ugandan risk governance system since the individual 
departments operates independently and therefore can specialize in their areas. Thereby, the 
structure is profitable for the Ugandan risk governance system and it also confirms its 
adaptability. 
 
In addition, the division in PEPD is preventing corruption because it clarifies the roles. When 
one department is responsible for passing the laws and another department is enforcing the 
laws, there is a double-checking of regulations. The new structure puts actors into a new 
organizational context, and thereby change conditions, attitudes and behavior (Beer et al., 
1990b). Following Olsen and Lindøe (2009), technologies in use will gradually improve as the 
actors gain more knowledge and experience, which in turn improve the robustness of the 
system.  
 
6.1.4 Focus on time prioritization 
The Ugandan Government focuses on increasing capacity within the risk governance system 
before the production starts. It requires technological change over time during the transfer 
process. Following Aven and Renn (2010) institutions and organizations must be strengthened 
so that they are empowered to perform their tasks in the most effective and fair manner. 
Implement changes and understand the whole technological picture is a process. Thus, the focus 
on time contributes to increase the capacity of the system.   
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However, Norway has worked at developing a coherent, integrated legal framework for 
regulating HSE in the petroleum industry for more than 30 years. Following, technologies do 
gradually improve as the stakeholders gain more knowledge and experience (Olsen & Lindøe, 
2009). It is expected that Uganda has a robust and well-functioning system in place before 
production starts in 2018. In addition to the shortage of time, Uganda does not share the same 
foundation and preconditions as Norway. Thus, capacity building takes time but is crucial to 
create and obtain a sustainable risk governance system. 
 
One cannot learn the theory without gaining experience from practical work (Imsen, 2005). 
There appears to be a trend within the government that the employees spend more time at 
conferences than working in the office. This means the care-why regarding focus on learning 
is not completely utilized. A balance between networking and education, and practical 
experience must be found. As Olsen and Lindøe (2009) states, technological change require the 
technology to be adaptable to the context and working environment. This means one must spend 
time in the context to see the benefits and limitations. Following Olsen (1996) interest and 
motives, affect actions, and so the learning outcome. Spending more time at conferences abroad 
may hamper the implementation of the technological elements.  
 
6.1.5 Summary 
The focus within the cooperation between Norway and Uganda is mainly on improving the 
Ugandan risk governance system. This is done by looking to Norway and using elements of the 
Norwegian system, which is seen as beneficial for Uganda. Only individual elements are 
transferred, not the entire system, since this is considered an impossible task. Norway is the 
cooperating country. The shared experiences and adapted elements appear as a blueprint of the 
Norwegian risk governance system. Other options are not considered, which is unfortunate. By 
transferring only certain elements, and not the entire system, it is important to monitor changes 
in composition of transferred elements. The operations and risks of the elements may change 
due to the lack of supporting elements. 
 
The motivation needs to be initiated by the Ugandan actors. Motivation is a central part of the 
transfer process, due to choice of cooperating country and emphasis within the transfer. 
Increased capacity and focus on time prioritization to ensure good implementation is considered 
to be crucial, and a step-one in the transfer process. The capacity is increased through measures 
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made regarding learning and structural changes. However, experience based knowledge cannot 
be compensated by planning and education.  
 
6.2 Research question 2 
What impact has the present capacity in the Ugandan risk governance system on the 
implementation of new technology? 
 
Firstly, the importance of knowledge in the system is discussed. Further, the efficiency and its 
impact on the implementation is explored. Following, composition and involvement of 
stakeholders are studied. Lastly organizational structure and its impact on implementation of 
new technology are outlined. 
 
6.2.1 Importance of knowledge  
The presence of knowledge in the Ugandan risk governance system contributes to a complete 
understanding of the technology and achieves the know-how. As stated in Røvik (2007) and 
Olsen (1996) the competence and knowledge of the involved individuals and organizations are 
the critical success factor for the implementation of new technology.  
 
The Ugandan Government has an inside-out position to the process and a direct relationship in 
the decisions of the selected technology (Olsen, 1996). Extensive knowledge about their own 
internal systems and the possible outcome of the changes is required. Even though know-how 
is sufficient knowledge to perform a task, it is required that the government has a know-why 
understanding of the risk governance system and the necessary preconditions.  
 
The findings indicate that the two most influential stakeholders have the ability in terms of 
competence to manage the new technology in a safe manner. Moreover, PEPD will therefore 
be capable of selecting technologies that are suitable for the system. As Olsen and Lindøe 
(2009) states, the important aspects of technological systems may be hidden although it is in 
the environment while in use. Accumulation of the know-why aspect can therefore be path 
dependent. A close working relationship and cooperation, like Norway and Uganda has created, 
will increase the understandings of the principles underlying the risk governance system. Thus, 
convert some of the tacit knowledge to be explicit for sharing between the parties.   
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The petroleum companies receive guidance from the Ugandan Government in how to manage 
and comply with the new laws, and understanding their responsibility. The individual capacity 
has increased for the petroleum companies following that learning happens in interaction with 
others (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). This guidance and learning is necessary, as the laws can be 
interpreted differently. The guidance by the government contributes positively and creates 
similar compliance to the new laws and common understandings between actors. The orgware 
seem to have been strengthened as a result of this focus. This development has promoted a more 
solid risk governance system.  
 
Furthermore, questions relating to the justification and implementation of changes are raised. 
The environmental impact assessment is an example of this issue. The report was not completed 
on time and the decisions were made before the report was reviewed. This example 
demonstrates poor decisions and the lack of understanding by the government. As man-made 
disaster theory argues, human factors such as knowledge has an impact and may cause 
undesired events. Therefore, implementing new strategies and procedures requires the 
stakeholders to achieve knowledge on know-what, know-how and know-why to be able to 
understand the technologies and its advantages and consequences.  
 
6.2.2 Efficiency 
The frustrations of the lack of efficiency in the Ugandan system are a challenge for the 
petroleum companies. The petroleum companies in Uganda are considered serious stakeholders 
with focus on HSE management. They appear as important players in the risk governance 
system. Thereby, a part of what make the elements function the way it is intended in the system 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Consequently, operating with “African time” could lead to departure of the 
serious petroleum companies.  
 
“African time” may appear as an underlying precondition, which entails that governments 
choices must take this into account. The 24/7 monitoring approach take into account that actions 
are slow in the country. This is supported by the findings that the petroleum companies can see 
the strategy as positive, because it removes the slow approval process. Moreover, the approach 
facilitates a dialogue with the government on a day-to-day basis, which is beneficial during 
drilling when decisions are made frequently. From this point of view, the government is 
creating a solution suitable for their local context. Thus, understand the underlying 
preconditions, and how it is valuable for the Ugandan risk governance system.   
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6.2.3 Interplay of stakeholders 
The presence of only two main stakeholders can have an impact on the risk governance system. 
Aven and Renn (2010) highlight the importance of how the governing choices are seen as an 
interplay between all stakeholders in the industry. If not all stakeholders are involved, the risk 
picture can change, and certain risk aspects may be left out. Following the man-made disaster 
theory, this lack of involvement increase the possibility for undesired events (Pidgeon & 
O'Leary, 2000). A risk evaluation, such as RNNP, performed by the stakeholder cooperation 
will only include the views of the government and the petroleum companies. This will eliminate 
the risks seen by the NGOs, unions, sub-contractors and society. Stakeholders from different 
levels contribute with different knowledge and values, which should be considered (Aven & 
Renn, 2010). Lack of inclusion and involvement in the interplay could be consequence. The 
rationality of the risk-based decisions could be different in the transfer (Aven & Renn, 2010). 
Consequently, this has a large effect on the risk governance system in Uganda as not all 
stakeholders in the industry are involved in the risk evaluation.  
 
To include a third party, like unions and NGOs, in the risk governance system, would require 
these smaller stakeholders to increase their capacity (Aven & Renn, 2010). As the findings 
indicate, these stakeholders do not currently have the knowledge or structure to join as a third 
party in the collaboration. Thereby, it would not strengthen the risk governance system if a third 
party was included, as the parties are not equally strong.  
 
The risks emphasized by NGOs, Unions, contractors and media are seen as a challenge by the 
government. The opinions of all these actors are causing problems for the government in a 
society with lack of focus on safety and security. Following Olsen (1996) and Røvik (2007), 
the lack of focus affects the technology transfer. However, the interests and motives to the 
stakeholders are guided by the information about alternatives and the knowledge they have 
about technologies and risks (Olsen, 1996). Since the majority of the NGOs and unions are 
informed through media their focus is mainly on the environmental issues attached to the 
petroleum production. Consequently, it is difficult for the government to make these 
stakeholders understand the importance of other risk related issues. Following the definition of 
capacity, this highlights the importance of being transparent towards all stakeholders.   
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The interplay between the stakeholders are of more importance, than the individual capacity. 
This is supported by Rasmussen (1997) who emphasize that a system is more than the sum of 
its elements. The way these stakeholders interact and make up for the lack of capacity in some 
actors will, based on this statement, be the important feature of the system. If the government 
guarantees the safety of the workers, the union can focus on their specialty areas, as for example 
salaries. Thus, as long as one stakeholder is managing what needs to be managed, the system 
as a whole will still have the capacity.  
 
6.2.4 Organizational structure 
It is clear that the hierarchical structure is a challenge to the capacity in the government. In 
Norway, the structure is flat and this has an effect on the elements being implemented. These 
two structural choices, as orgware elements, are different and have an impact on the way the 
industry is functioning (Aven & Renn, 2010). 
 
Moreover, some of the transferred elements have high focus on trust, cooperation, interaction, 
and the option to think outside the strict limitations. However, in the Ugandan risk governance 
system, these aspects are harder to identify and develop. This means that some of the 
implemented elements do not have the required prerequisites supporting the functionality 
(Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). In other words, there is a possibility of the implementation not being 
successful.  
 
Lack of creativity, hiding of information and individual orientation results that the knowledge 
within the risk governance system is not being completely utilized. These factors have to be 
acknowledged as preconditions in the Ugandan risk governance system (Aven & Renn, 2010). 
Contrary to Norway, these features are valued and important aspects of the system. These 
preconditions limit the implementations, and it is not socially acceptable to implement all the 
suggested orgware elements (Olsen & Lindøe, 2009). Thus, the challenge is to implement the 
changes in an environment where the structure is different and the fundamental values vary.  
 
This corresponds to the discussion in research question one in relation to understanding how 
changes will affect the system, and how the system will affect the changes. Thereby, different 
preconditions are not seen as a hinder in implementation of technologies, rather as a 
characteristic of the local context, needed to be considered when contextualizing a technology.  
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6.2.5 Summary 
High competence and knowledge of the stakeholders are in negative correlation to the 
uncertainties related to implementation of new technology. With increased knowledge, 
competence and know-why, the uncertainties are reduced. The Ugandan Government and the 
petroleum companies have the required knowledge, and in cooperation with the Norwegian 
Government through the OfD program they have the required capacity to successfully 
implement new technology. 
 
The efficiency of the system is related to time management. The expression “African time” 
implies that things take a long time. This fact challenges the capacity within the Ugandan risk 
governance system and has an impact on the functioning of the new technology.  
 
The interplay of the stakeholders are challenging the implementation due to lack of information 
and involvement in the system. However, it is only the government and the petroleum 
companies who are perceived as the influential stakeholders. As long as two strong stakeholders 
cover all aspects of the system, this will positively affect the implementation of new technology. 
Lack of stakeholders concerned about workers interest may make decisions biased, and hence 
reduce the efficiency of the decisions.  
 
The organizational structure is affected by the Ugandan culture and preconditions. 
Preconditions complicate the implementation as they needs to be considered when 
contextualizing elements.  
 
6.3 Research question 3 
In what way is trust present in the Ugandan risk governance system? 
 
Trust is strongly integrated in the Norwegian risk governance system. The analysis contains 
trust in the social climate, the presence of trust through understanding and as an instrument. 
 
6.3.1 Trust in the social climate 
It appears that the presence of trust or distrust in the Ugandan risk governance system is 
understood differently by several of the informants. Both Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) and 
Kerkhof et al. (2003) brings up the complexity in trust, and that trust can be seen from different 
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perspectives. As findings emphasize, the stakeholders in the cooperation trust each other’s 
competence and skills. This implies that the stakeholders trust each other to perform safe 
operations. Seen from the relational perspective, all informants trust the skills and competence 
of the other stakeholders, which is seen as a part of cognitive trust. However, as the affective 
trust focus on the care demonstrated by the trusted party, different motivations could affect the 
trust relationship in the stakeholder network. 
 
The findings show that secrecy, corruption, lack of motivation and different values internally 
and externally are part of conditions found in the Ugandan risk governance system. This 
indicates that the social climate consists of distrust. Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) present one 
view of trust, seen from the relational perspective and emphasize how social motivation within 
trust is essential. As the findings implies, the informants are concerned about the other 
stakeholders’ motivation regarding internal and external goal orientation, and the personal 
motives of the employees. Following, the personal motivation of the employees affects the 
choices they make (Asbjørnsen et al., 1999). One example is the 24/7 monitoring approach 
which is an opportunity for the regulators to earn higher salaries as observers. This extra 
payment is often necessary, as Uganda does not have an established salary system. The 
motivation is therefore shaped by the cultural baggage apparent in Uganda (Olsen, 1996). 
Thereby, distrust is a precondition in the Ugandan risk governance system.  
 
6.3.2 Trust is present in the way Ugandans understand trust 
The findings indicate that the trust present in Uganda can be seen from a rational trust 
perspective. Hence, trust is a choice behavior of seeing the positive consequences of trusting 
the other actors (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). The positive consequences relates to findings are 
amongst others financial benefits, functioning of the elements and an easier regulatory system 
appearing in Uganda. A system not dependent on trust will require clarity of roles and a strict 
follow up, due to the dynamic environment the petroleum industry operates in. Thus, the 
positive consequences of choosing to trust are apparent. This implies that Ugandans sees trust 
as purely instrumental, where social motivational drives are not included. Thereby, there is a 
presence of rational trust in the system.  
 
As Gilje and Grimen (1993) states, different understandings is a result of different experiences 
and information. The iceberg is multidimensional and looking at the iceberg from different 
angels will display different issues, trust and tacit knowledge. Furthermore, Bhatt (2002) 
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emphasize how that subjective observations of the information is the crucial part of knowledge. 
Therefore, trust can be viewed as ambiguous knowledge. The Ugandan actors view of trust vary 
from the view of the Norwegian risk governance system. This supports the view that trust exists 
in the Ugandan risk governance system through choice behavior in the way these stakeholders 
understand trust.  
 
It seems clear that Ugandan actors have a know-why understanding of the Norwegian risk 
governance system. This finding is in relation to the Ugandan actors understanding of how 
prerequisites, such as trust are found dependent in the system. Following Cohen (2004), this is 
a result of an understanding of the combination of inforware, technoware, humanware and 
orgware within the Norwegian risk governance system. Considering the definition of know-
why, the knowledge Ugandan actors have gained about the Norwegian risk governance system 
includes an understanding of the principles underlying the system. Thereby, this definition 
supports the findings. However, trust does also have principles underlying its concept that needs 
to be understood. Thereby, trust is perceived differently between Norwegian and Ugandan 
actors.  
 
6.3.3 Trust is present as a strategic plan 
It appears that the government in Uganda tries to create trust through technoware elements. 
Building a risk governance system based on trust can affect and change the attitudes held by 
the stakeholders, and thereby create trust. According to Beer et al. (1990b), conditions and 
behavior will change more effectively if they are put into a new organizational context that 
imposes new roles, responsibilities and relationships. This idea is supported by Rasmussen 
(1997), which highlights the necessity to focus on the mechanism generating behavior in the 
environment. A new structure will from this point of view generate behavior, and contribute in 
creating trust. This view confirms that if a trusting environment is found to be beneficial, 
choices of control can be created before a trusting culture is integrated.  
 
The changes that are planned for Uganda accommodate for a trusting culture. One example is 
the development of the NOC. A great part of the informants from the petroleum companies 
complained about rejection of plans and expenses regarding risk management. It is expected 
that a NOC will increase the mutual understanding between the government and petroleum 
companies. In view the concerns that petroleum companies don’t understand the reasons behind 
rejections, the development of a NOC might be the element needed to increase the mutual 
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understanding regarding cost and planning for risk management. Thus, create trust through 
implementation of a strategic plan. In view of the relational perspective, all ends up in common 
interests for a robust risk governance system. Thus, the technoware will change the humanware 
and orgware seen in light of actions and attitudes.  
 
These arguments open up for opportunities for Ugandan actors to create trust through 
technoware elements. Despite this, one should consider whether changes in technoware are 
sufficient to create trust in the system. In light of the theory, when changes appear in one or 
more of the technological elements, changes are required in other elements to ensure the balance 
of the technological system will work as intended. Considering the view of Beer et al. (1990b), 
the only organizational context that is changed using this strategy is the technoware. As the 
humanware, inforware and orgware are other important elements in a risk governance system, 
these elements may generate resistance to the changes. Considering the view that each country 
is such a complex product of its own technology, history, political institutions, culture and 
management, underline the idea that trust as a strategic plan can be a challenge (Bang & 
Thunestad, 2014).  
 
The balance around technoware, which in Norway is perceived as trust dependent, in a country 
where there is a lack of trust, will have an impact on the technology. All four components form 
a seamless web that constitutes technological pathways (Engen, 2014). This raises the question 
whether the advantages arising from technologies, disappear when they are implemented into a 
different stakeholder network, where the relationship is not as strong between the stakeholders. 
This is acknowledged through how the whole system needs to be taken into account, including 
stakeholders involved and its social climate (Aven & Renn, 2010).  
 
By creating trust through a strategic plan, the Ugandan Government has an instrumental view 
on the system. This is a narrow view of an organization where the background and the cultural 
baggage of the individuals included are not considered (Gilje & Grimen, 1993). As findings 
show, the social climate in the Ugandan risk governance system consists of distrust. 
Considering that all elements are equally balanced within a risk governance system, trust will 
affect the implementation and functionality of the technology. In other words, the social 
construction cannot be left out when considering how the elements will work in practice. 
Therefore, to expect trust to be built through planning and implementation of structures alone 
is a too narrow understanding of a complex system. 
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Seen from another point of view, trust is not generated over night (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). 
It is a need to create a structure and interactions, opening up for trust and thereby trust will 
follow. This is supported by Olsen and Lindøe (2009), which emphasize that technologies in 
use gradually will improve as the actors gain more knowledge or experience. Thereby, choice 
of regulation strategies can, over time make the Ugandan risk governance system move towards 
a trust relationship between the government and petroleum companies.  
 
6.3.4 Summary 
The presence of trust is one of the main prerequisites in Norway. Findings show that trust is not 
present in the same way in Uganda. However, trust can be seen from a different perspective. It 
appears that the Ugandan risk governance system have a rational trust perspective. Trust is 
present as an instrument that can be created through design of systems. However, the social 
motivation drives, which includes important mechanisms within a risk governance system are 
not included from this perspective. This creates a narrow understanding of a complex system 
built on distrust. Nevertheless, trust can be built over time, as long as the structure and 
stakeholder interactions are receptive towards trust.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify what promote and/or hamper the transfer of risk 
governance systems from the Norwegian petroleum sector to Uganda. The Norwegian risk 
governance system is complex and strongly integrated in the Norwegian petroleum industry. It 
is argued that the concept of transferring such a complex and integrated system requires 
considerations of parameters promoting and/or hampering the transfer. To find these 
parameters, three research questions were created. These questions emphasized the relevant 
actors focus areas within transfer of risk governance systems from Norway to Uganda. 
Furthermore a study of the impact the present capacity can have on implementation of new 
technology, and in what way trust is present in the Ugandan risk governance system.  
 
Several parameters would promote and/or hamper the transfer of a technological system. As a 
technological system includes technologies, organizational routines, information and 
knowledge, it is easy to understand that this creates challenges in the transfer process. 
Therefore, we still have an impression that the claims regarding the transfer of risk governance 
systems, and the findings of the present conditions in Uganda, are a rough simplification of a 
very complex picture. Despite the limitations made, we are still facing two very different 
systems with a large number of actors making up these systems. In addition, the study context 
is in a dynamic environment where changes appear continuously. Particularly in Uganda, as the 
country is moving closer to production. Following, the full effect of the technology transfer will 
not appear until after production begins. This reduces the validity of the conclusions drawn. 
 
However, through this study, we have found some central parameters that we believe will 
promote and/or hamper the transfer of risk governance systems. We have not divided our 
findings into which ‘hamper’ and ‘promotes’ the transfer, as the parameters outcome are 
depending on the conditions, and could be both hampering or promoting the transfer.    
 
The main conclusions drawn are categorized through “interplay” and “characteristics” among 
the involved actors in the transfer process, “time” and “preconditions” in the systems. 
 
The interplay among the involved actors in the transfer process is of importance regarding 
understandings. This is because implementation of technologies is dependent on the actors and 
organizations involved, and their existing knowledge about technologies, and the local contexts. 
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Actors’ understandings can thereby hamper and/or promote the transfer. Different 
understandings create uncertainties and unclear underlying latent conditions when transferring 
technologies, which hamper the transfer process. It is likely that a transfer will be colored by 
the system apparent in the “senders” local context, and this needs to be considered when 
selecting a cooperating country. Inclusion and involvement horizontally in the cooperation, as 
well as vertically in the system, will promote and/or hamper the technology transfer. All 
stakeholders need to be included, to be able to choose and implement a technology to a new 
local context. 
 
The characteristics of the actors involved in the transfer process are found upon motivation, 
willingness and knowledge. Motivation and willingness is parameters creating different views 
and actions. It is perceived that actors involved in the transfer process can have different 
motivations regarding personal gain and risk perception caused by the varying local contexts. 
Different motivations and willingness thereby affects the adaption of systems and could be a 
promoting and/or hampering parameter. Knowledge is an influential parameter that will hamper 
or promote the transfer due to what extent there is a know-why understanding of the systems.  
 
Time builds trust and generates experiences, competence and understandings. Prioritization of 
time is therefore a parameter seen as promoting technology transfer and contributes to reduce 
the tacit knowledge within the technologies. However, the balance of time is a challenge as all 
actors require different time schedules and have different expectations. 
 
Different preconditions in the system can be seen as a characteristic of the local context and 
needs to be considered when contextualizing a technology. Preconditions such as creativity, 
team orientation, efficiency and trust can challenge the capacity, and therefore the 
implementation of new technology. Thereby, capacity is a promoting and/or hampering 
parameter. This means that with increased capacity through knowledge that includes a know-
why understanding, uncertainties are reduced.  
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7.1 Contribution 
 
Technology transfer can be beneficial and contribute to create a more robust risk governance 
system, as long as it takes certain aspects into account. Our study contributes to a better 
understanding of which aspects are important to consider in a technology transfer. This 
understanding is useful in terms of both capacity building, and as technology transfer between 
national and international organizations. “Recipient” and “sender” organizations will therefore 
benefit from this study in terms of understandings about parameters that promote and/or hamper 
transfer of risk governance systems. Thus, better understanding will reduce uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities in the transfer process and systems.   
 
7.2 Future research 
 
Firstly, it would be interesting to repeat this study in five to ten years when Uganda is a 
petroleum producer and further observe how Uganda manage after termination of the OfD 
program. If the changes at government level have affected the rest of the petroleum industry, 
this will be seen as a positive development. It would also be interesting to compare the 
development of Ugandan risk governance system to other developing countries. Either 
countries that takes part in the OfD program, or countries that manage on their own and use 
other risk governance systems as a basis. Such studies can contribute to better understandings 
of the advantages and challenges created by the adapted elements. Further, a study aiming to 
understand what elements could be transferred and in what order these elements should be 
adapted. It would be interesting to study if there are any requirements in the order to follow 
when developing capacity.  
 
Another interesting topic to study is Uganda’s considerations for selecting a “sender”, which in 
this case is Norway. What are the important qualities of the “sender”, and how can this affect 
the transfer. Alternatively, one may study which requirements the “sender” should look for in 
the “receiver” country in order to have success with the OfD program.  
 
It will also be interesting to study the inner and outer context concept of the OfD program for 
other countries cooperating with Norway, for example Tanzania.  
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Appendix 1 – Actors in the OfD program regarding risk 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OfD cooperation
Norway
Overall: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Chair), Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance, Norwegian Ministry of Environment, 
Norad (secretariat), Norwegian embassy in 
Uganda, Petrad
Implementing agencies: The Norwegian 
Petroleum directorate, Petroleum Safety 
Authority, Research institutions, Consultants
Uganda
Overall: Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development , Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development, Ministry of 
Water and Environment
Implementing agencies: National 
Environmental Management Authority, The 
Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Department
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Appendix 2 – List used in literature study 
 
 
Author Name 
Eggen, Ø. (2013) Oil For Development; challenges and success 
Eggen, Ø., & Raha, H. (2012) External evaluation of LO-Norway's cooperation with 
National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU) 
Fulgestad, N. H. (2013) Knowledge transfer and capacity development 
regarding risk management in the Oil Industry. 
ILPI. (2013) Risk assessment for the oil for development programme 
in Uganda 
MEMD. (2010) A development Programme in Co-operation with 
Norway 
MEMD. (2013) Strategic Environmental Assessment of Oil and Gas 
Activities in the Albertine Graben, Uganda 
MEMD. (2014) Report to the fifth annual meeting for the programme 
"strengthening the management of the oil and gas sector 
in Uganda 
Shepherd, B. (2013) Oil in Uganda; International Lessons for Success 
Total E&P Uganda (2014) Safety results from 2013 
Tullow  Safety results from 2013 
CNOOC Safety results from 2013 
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Appendix 3 – List of informants 
 
 
  Organization Description Level Interview 
guide 
Norway         
  NPSA Manager, male 
(Uganda OfD 
program) 
Strategic 4 
    Manager, male 
(another OfD 
program) 
Strategic 4 
  Norwegian Embassy 
in Uganda 
Middle manager, 
female 
Strategic 4 
  OfD resident 
coordinator 
Manager, male Operational 1 
          
Uganda         
  CNOOC Middle manager, male Actors in risk governance 
system 
2 
  Total Manager, male Actors in risk governance 
system 
2 
  Tullow Middle manager, 
female 
Actors in risk governance 
system 
2 
    Middle manager, male Actors in risk governance 
system 
2 
  NGO Middle manager, 
female 
Actors in risk governance 
system 
5 
    Middle manager, 
female 
Actors in risk governance 
system 
5 
  Union Manager, male Actors in risk governance 
system 
5 
  PEPD/MEMD Middle manager, male Operational 3 
    Middle manager, male Operational 3 
    Manager, male Strategic 3 
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Appendix 4 – Interview guide 
 
1 - Interview with operational actors in the cooperation (Norway) 
 
General 
 What role do you play in the OfD program?  
 What level do you work towards? Government/ petroleum companies/unions? 
 How long have you worked with the OfD program? What is your background? 
 
Cooperation 
 From your point of view, what has been the major changes in the system after the 
cooperation began? 
 How is the Ugandan culture accepting the proposed changes? 
 How does the changes align with the Ugandan Culture? 
 Cross cultural understandings 
 How do you think the Norwegians perceive the Ugandan culture? 
 How do you talk together about cultural differences?  
 
 
Achievements (What is working and why) 
 What are the achievements from the OfD program? 
 Why are these changes considered achievements? 
 Are they long term achievements? 
 Are they sustainable? 
 What do you think is the reason for these achievements?  
 
Challenges 
 What are the challenges for the OfD program? 
 Why are these factors considered as challenges? 
 How are these challenges manageable? 
 Some of the changes are major changes in organizational and governmental structure, 
how are these changes received and implemented in practice? 
 What are the major uncertainties around the program? 
 What are the major uncertainties around risk management of the petroleum sector?  
 What are the challenges ahead in the program? 
 
Development and changes 
 Previous system of Petroleum operations at governmental/regulatory level:  
 How was the systems before the cooperation with Norway?  
 What has been brought forward from the previous system (as important elements)? 
 How are the laws compared to Norwegian laws and regulations? 
 The Working Environmental Act?? 
 Petroleums Act? 
 How are the functional based regulations incorporated into the new act? 
 How is this received by the involved parties? 
 What are the necessary elements to effectively enforce regulations 
 What other systems has been in place for other natural resources previously?  
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 Are the current system in line with those regulations? 
 What has been brought forward from these systems?  
 What changes have been made since the cooperation started? 
 Some elements that came more natural?  
 What elements are more challenging? 
 How the is process with the division of PEPD coming along? 
 Some of the changes are major changes in organizational and governmental structure, 
how are these changes received? 
 Where in the process is Uganda in establishing a national oil company? 
 Why do Uganda see it as necessary to establish a national oil company? 
 How will this play a role in the petroleum industry? 
 There are planned changes to the supervision strategy approach to move away from 
24/7 monitoring. How are these plans coming along? What are the plans ahead? 
 What is your perception of the cooperation between the Government, Unions and oil 
companies? Do they manage to work together? 
 Has there been a change in the relationship between the regulators and the oil 
companies since the cooperation between Uganda and Norway began? 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed since the start of the OfD 
cooperation? 
 What visible changes have been made?  
 
Actors 
 Who are the relevant actors, other than the government and oil companies, in the 
Ugandan petroleum industry? 
 Eks. Unions, communities 
 What unions (labor organizations) are present in Uganda? 
 What is their role in the current system? In what way are they involved and cooperating 
with the government and oil organizations? 
 Who else has played a role in the preparation of HSE in the petroleum industry 
 Can you help us get in touch with these organizations / representatives? 
 
Risk governance 
Tripartite system 
 What is your perception of the cooperation between the Government and oil 
companies? 
 Are there any forums or discussion opportunities between the Government and the oil 
companies? 
 Is the aim to develop a tripartite system in Uganda? 
 What do you expect the challenges to be? 
 
Internal Controls 
 Has there been any requirements placed on the oil companies in relation to their 
internal controls? 
 
Functional based regulations 
 This has been implemented for a year now in the Petroleum Act, how has this been 
received by the oil companies and the industry? 
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 How have you assisted the oil companies in reaching these functional based 
regulations? 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed over the last few years? 
 
Pre-requisites 
 What do you feel has been the necessary pre-requisites to implement the changes and 
to make them sustainable? 
 What are specific to risk management? 
 What are important framework conditions to consider in Uganda? 
 Politics, environment, culture, economic stability, infrastructure? 
 What are required to ensure the changes are implemented and remain implemented? 
 How do you explain the prerequisites and the knowledge in praksis?  
 How did you obtain understanding of Ugandan culture and way of working? 
 How is tacit knowledge handled?  
 What are the pre-requisites for the risk management system (tripartite system, internal 
control and functional based regulations) to function in Norway? 
 Eks. Trust, competence, equality, communication, transparency,  
 Are these pre-requisites present in Uganda? 
 How do you view the use of time in the processes in Uganda? 
 
 
2- Interview with actors in the Ugandan Petroleum Industry 
 
General 
 What is your role in the organization and what is your background? 
 How long have you organization been in Uganda? 
 Do you operate in other similar countries? 
 What do you know about the OfD program? 
 How involved are you? 
 How do you view the program and the cooperation between countries? 
 Cooperation 
 From your point of view, what has been the major changes in the system after the OfD 
program cooperation began? 
 How is the Ugandan culture accepting the proposed changes? 
 How does the changes align with the Ugandan Culture? 
 
Development and changes 
 From your point of view, what have been the major changes in the system in the last 
years (2009)? 
 What is positive with the new changes? 
 What are the challenges with the new changes? 
 In what way are the changes sustainable? 
 What role do your organization play in the development of the petroleum industry?  
 In what way are the changes in line with your internal culture and practice? 
 How many of your employees are from Uganda? Do you have specific policies to employ 
employees from the resident country? 
 What skills do these employees have? 
93 
 
 
 
Challenges 
 What challenges do you as an international oil company meet in Uganda? 
 Are these specific to Uganda? 
 Why are these factors considered as challenges? 
 How are these challenges manageable? 
 Some of the changes made in the last few years are major changes in organizational 
and governmental structure, how are these changes affecting your organization? 
 
Changes in the Uganda Petroleum Sector regarding HSE  
 How has the new petroleum act affected you? 
 How does this act require changes in how your company’s risk management practices 
are performed? 
 What is your view on the cooperation between the Government and oil companies? 
 How is your company’s cooperation with the government? 
 Who do you cooperate and communicate the most with? 
 How is your relationship with the new PSA? 
 The government is moving towards functional based regulation, what is your view on 
that?  
 How does this affect you? 
 Do you operate in that was in other countries?  
 Is it effective for your operations? 
 What is your view on Uganda establishing a national oil company? 
 How will this play a role in the petroleum industry? 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed over the last few years (2009)? 
 What visible changes have been made?  
 How has this affected you and the way you operate on a daily basis? 
 What are the challenges and uncertainties for the Ugandan petroleum industry 
regarding risk management?  
 
Actors 
 Who are the relevant actors, other than the government and oil companies, in the 
Ugandan petroleum industry? 
 Eks. Unions, communities 
 How is your cooperation with them? 
 Who else has played a role in the preparation of HSE in the petroleum industry? 
 Prerequisites 
 What has been the necessary prerequisites to implement the changes and to make 
them sustainable? 
 What are specific to risk management? 
 What are important framework conditions to consider in Uganda 
 Politics, environment, culture, economic stability, infrastructure 
 What are required to ensure the changes are implemented and remain implemented? 
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3 - Interview with operational and strategic actors involved in the 
cooperation (Uganda) 
 
General 
 What role do you play? How long have you been working there? What is your 
background? 
 Cooperation 
 Who is involved with the cooperation between Norway and Uganda? 
 From your point of view, what has been the major changes in the system after the 
cooperation began? 
 How is the Ugandan culture and society accepting the proposed changes? 
 How does the changes align with the Ugandan Culture? 
 How is this Cooperation working? Does Norway have people in Uganda at all times? 
Does anyone from Uganda travel to Norway? 
 Are there any other countries or systems that is used as inspiration to the new system 
in Uganda? 
 
Cross cultural understandings 
 How do you think the Norwegians perceive your culture? 
 How do you talk about cultural differences?  
 How do you decide what to focus on from the Norwegian model?  
 How do you see the different risk management aspects of the Norwegian model 
generalized so it can be used in a different context? 
 
 
Development and changes 
 Previous system of Petroleum operations at governmental/regulatory level:  
 How was the systems before the cooperation with Norway?  
 What has been brought forward from the previous system (as important elements)? 
 What other systems has been in place for other natural resources previously?  
 Are the current system in line with those regulations? 
 What has been brought forward from these systems?  
 What changes have been made since the cooperation started? 
 Some elements that came more natural?  
 Some elements that are more challenging? 
 How the is process with the PSA coming along? 
 What is the status regarding establishing a national oil company? When is this expected 
to be in operation? 
 Has there been a change in the relationship between the regulators and the oil 
companies since the cooperation between Uganda and Norway began? 
 
Achievements (What is working and why) 
 What are the achievements from the OfD program? 
 Why are these changes considered achievements? 
 Are they long term achievements? 
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 Are they sustainable? 
 What do you think is the reason for these achievements?  
 
Challenges 
 What are the challenges for the OfD program? 
 Why are these factors considered as challenges? 
 How are these challenges manageable? 
 Some of the changes are major changes in organizational and governmental structure, 
how are these changes received and implemented in practice? 
 What are the major uncertainties around the program? 
 What are the major uncertainties around risk management of the petroleum sector?  
 What are the challenges ahead in the program? 
 
Actors 
 Who are the relevant actors in the Ugandan oil sector? 
 Who are the unions or NGO’s that play a major part in the development? 
 What is the position of the Unions and NGOs in Uganda? 
 
Risk governance in Uganda 
Tripartite system 
 What is your perception of the cooperation between the Government and oil 
companies? 
 Do you work together? 
 Are the oil companies included in the process of setting up new laws and regulations? 
 Are there any forums or discussion opportunities between the Government and the oil 
companies? 
 Is the aim to develop a tripartite system? 
 What do you expect the challenges to be? 
 
Internal Controls 
 Has there been any requirements placed on the oil companies in relation to their 
internal controls? 
 
Functional based regulations 
 This has been implemented for a year now in the Petroleum Act, how has this been 
received by the oil companies and the industry? 
 How have you assisted the oil companies in reaching these functional based 
regulations? 
 
Risk perception 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed over the last few years? 
 What visible changes has been made? 
  
Pre-requisites 
 What do you feel has been the necessary pre-requisites to implement the changes and 
to make them sustainable? 
 What are specific to risk management? 
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 What are important framework conditions to consider in Uganda? 
 Politics, environment, culture, economic stability, infrastructure? 
 What are required to ensure the changes are implemented and remain implemented? 
 
4 - Interview with strategic actors involved in the cooperation (Norway) 
 
General 
 What role do you play in the OfD program?  
 What level do you work towards? Government/ petroleum companies/unions? 
 How long have you worked with the OfD program? What is your background? 
 
Cooperation 
 Who is involved with the cooperation between Norway and Uganda? 
 From your point of view, what has been the major changes in the system after the 
cooperation began? 
 How is the Ugandan culture accepting the proposed changes? 
 How does the changes align with the Ugandan Culture? 
 How is this Cooperation working? Does Norway have people in Uganda at all times? 
Does anyone from Uganda travel to Norway? 
 Are there any other countries or systems that is used as inspiration to the new system 
in Uganda? 
 
Cross cultural understandings 
 How do you obtain an understanding of the Ugandan culture? 
 How do you think the Norwegians perceive the Ugandan culture? 
 How do you talk together about cultural differences?  
 How do you decide what to focus on from the Norwegian model?  
 How do you see the different risk management aspects of the Norwegian model 
generalized so it can be used in a different context? 
 
Achievements (What is working and why) 
 What are the achievements from the OfD program? 
 Why are these changes considered achievements? 
 Are they long term achievements? 
 Are they sustainable? 
 What do you think is the reason for these achievements?  
 
Challenges 
 What are the challenges for the OfD program? 
 Why are these factors considered as challenges? 
 How are these challenges manageable? 
 Some of the changes are major changes in organizational and governmental structure, 
how are these changes received and implemented in practice? 
 What are the major uncertainties around the program? 
 What are the major uncertainties around risk management of the petroleum sector?  
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 What are the challenges ahead in the program? 
 
Development and changes 
 Previous system of Petroleum operations at governmental/regulatory level:  
 How was the systems before the cooperation with Norway?  
 What has been brought forward from the previous system (as important elements)? 
 How are the laws compared to Norwegian laws and regulations? 
 The Working Environmental Act?? 
 Petroleums Act? 
 How are the functional based regulations incorporated into the new act? 
 How is this received by the involved parties? 
 What are the necessary elements to effectively enforce regulations 
 What other systems has been in place for other natural resources previously?  
 Are the current system in line with those regulations? 
 What has been brought forward from these systems?  
 What changes have been made since the cooperation started? 
 Some elements that came more natural?  
 What elements are more challenging? 
 How the is process with the division of PEPD coming along? 
 Some of the changes are major changes in organizational and governmental structure, 
how are these changes received? 
 Where in the process is Uganda in establishing a national oil company? 
 Why do Uganda see it as necessary to establish a national oil company? 
 How will this play a role in the petroleum industry? 
 There are planned changes to the supervision strategy approach to move away from 
24/7 monitoring. How are these plans coming along? What are the plans ahead? 
 Has there been a change in the relationship between the regulators and the oil 
companies since the cooperation between Uganda and Norway began? 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed since the start of the OfD 
cooperation? 
 What visible changes have been made?  
 
Actors 
 Who are the relevant actors in the Ugandan oil sector? 
 Who are the unions or NGO’s that play a major part in the development? 
 What is the position of the Unions and NGOs in Uganda? 
 
Risk governance 
Tripartite system 
 What is your perception of the cooperation between the Government and oil 
companies? 
 Are there any forums or discussion opportunities between the Government and the oil 
companies? 
 Is the aim to develop a tripartite system in Uganda? 
 What do you expect the challenges to be? 
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Internal Controls 
 Has there been any requirements placed on the oil companies in relation to their 
internal controls? 
 
Functional based regulations 
 This has been implemented for a year now in the Petroleum Act, how has this been 
received by the oil companies and the industry? 
 How have you assisted the oil companies in reaching these functional based 
regulations? 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed over the last few years? 
 
Pre-requisites 
 What do you feel has been the necessary pre-requisites to implement the changes and 
to make them sustainable? 
 What are specific to risk management? 
 What are important framework conditions to consider in Uganda? 
 Politics, environment, culture, economic stability, infrastructure? 
 What are required to ensure the changes are implemented and remain implemented? 
 How do you explain the prerequisites and the knowledge in praksis?  
 How did you obtain understanding of Ugandan culture and way of working? 
 How is tacit knowledge handled?  
 What are the pre-requisites for the risk management system (tripartite system, internal 
control and functional based regulations) to function in Norway? 
 Eks. Trust, competence, equality, communication, transparency,  
 Are these pre-requisites present in Uganda? 
 How do you view the use of time in the processes in Uganda? 
 
 
5 - Interview with third parties involved in the Ugandan petroleum 
industry 
 
General 
 What role do you play in the organization? How long have you been working there? 
What is your background? 
 How long have Oil in Uganda been operating? 
 What is the purpose and goals for the organization?  
 What do you know about the OfD program? 
 How involved are you? 
 How do you view the program and the cooperation between countries? 
 
Development and changes 
 From your point of view, what have been the major changes in the system in the last 
years (2009)? 
 What is positive with the new changes? 
 What are the challenges with these changes? 
 In what way are the changes sustainable?  
 How is the Ugandan culture accepting the proposed changes? 
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 What role do your organization play in the development of the petroleum industry?  
 Risk management 
 
Challenges 
 What do you see as the challenges in the Ugandan oil industry? 
 
Changes in the Uganda Petroleum Sector regarding HSE  
 Can you tell us about the new petroleum act and how this affects Uganda? 
 Can you tell about your organizations cooperation with the government and oil 
companies? 
 Who do you cooperate and communicate the most with? 
 What are the challenges and uncertainties for the Ugandan petroleum industry 
regarding risk management?  
 
Actors 
 Who are the relevant actors, other than the government and oil companies, in the 
Ugandan petroleum industry? 
 How is your cooperation with them? 
 Who else has played a role in the preparation of HSE in the petroleum industry? 
 
Risk governance in Uganda 
 What is your perception of the cooperation between the Government, Unions and oil 
companies? 
 Do they manage to work together? 
 Should they include other parties? 
 What does Uganda have that will make this possible to implement? 
 What do you expect the challenges to be? 
 What is your view on Uganda establishing a national oil company? 
 How will this play a role in the petroleum industry? 
 In what way has the risk perception in general changed over the last few years (2009)? 
 What visible changes have been made?  
 
Prerequisites 
 What do you feel has been necessary prerequisites to implement the changes and to 
make them sustainable? 
 What are specific to risk management? 
 What are important framework conditions to consider in Uganda 
 Politics, environment, culture, economic stability, infrastructure 
 What are required to ensure the changes are implemented and remain implemented? 
 
